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SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ARENA: REMOVING A FALSE RIGHT OF
SPECTACLE
EUGENE CERRUTI*

R.ecent historical scholarship has demonstrated that the practice of selfrepresentation at common law was developed and promoted not to secure a
valued right to the accused but rather to compromise the defendant's ability to
present an effective defense-by denying him an effective right to be represented
by counsel. The Supreme Court in Faretta v. California stood this history on its
head in order to read into the Sixth Amendment an implied right to selfrepresentation equal to the now preeminent right to counsel. The Faretta doctrine
was carel£ssly adopted yet has been resolutely defended by the Supreme Court, to
the almost universal chagrin of those most directly affected by its commands. The
recent Supreme Court case of Indiana v. Edwards is only a modest retreat from
the point/,ess imposition on the lower courts of a structurally and normatively
incompatib/,e right within the context of the contemporary counsel-driven system
of criminal justice.
A putative right to self-representation sil£ntly entered international law via a
back door at Nuremberg as a result of that tribunal's near-who/,esa/,e adoption of
· the apparent rights and protocols of the common law adversarial system. It was
subsequently adopted in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights as one of the standard "rights of the accused" but never actually put into
effect in international law until the creation of the various war crimes tribunals
of the last two decades. The right to self-representation has almost immediately
replicated its experience in American law by creating a shameful series of
disreputab/,e prosecutions. It has become another examp!,e of a feature of the
adversarial system, like that of the lay jury, which does not travel well-or at
all-to the international arena. The structural and normative groundings of
the international system make the right even more inapposite there than it now is
in the common law system. This artic/,e calls on the International Criminal
Court, the new standard-bearer of international criminal justice, to take
advantage of the upcoming seven-year review of its ru/,es and procedures to strike
from its Artic/,es a practice that has been reduced to litt/,e more than a perverse
right of spectac/,e.

* Eugene Cerruti, Professor of Law, New York Law School. I would like to extend many
thanks to Laurie A Moffat, now of Dewey & LeBoeuf, for her truly exceptional research assistance.
© 2009, Eugene Cerruti.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of self-representation in criminal proceedings began
not as a right but as a punitive requirement of the early common law
jury trial system. For centuries counsel was not permitted to represent
the accused precisely because it was anticipated that counsel would
make it less likely that the accused would be convicted. The practice
gained limited normative status on behalf of the accused largely as a
result of facetious rationalization by the common law courts in defense
of the practice. There have been only several historical moments in
both England and America where the practice has been genuinely
regarded as a positive feature, allowing for popular resistance to
politically inspired prosecutions. The contemporary recognition of a
right of self-representation therefore has very limited historical grounding, which is at best limited to the unique circumstances of the
common law jury system. It enjoys virtually no recognition as a right
within the criminal justice systems of civil law countries. 1 It has even less
of a foundation, either normative or systemic, in the contemporary
"mixed," or "hybrid," 2 systems of international criminal justice, which
present to the accused neither a political sovereign to resist nor a
fellow-citizen jury to appeal to. This article therefore argues for withdrawing any recognition of the right (as opposed to the mere privilege)
within the realm of international criminal justice and, particularly,
within the rules governing legal practice before the much-heralded
International Criminal Court (ICC).
The proponents of a sui generis international criminal procedural law
have gradually come to recognize that the adversarial criminal procedure of the common law system does not travel well to the international
arena. The structural and normative differences between the national
and international systems are formidable. But the procedural template
for war crimes prosecutions established at Nuremberg did at least
recognize at the outset that one of the pillars of the common law
system, the lay jµry, was untenable in the international setting. 3 This

1. Michael P. Scharr, Seif-Representation versus Assignments ofDefence Counsel Before International
Tribunals, 4J. INT'L GRIM.Jusr. 31, 35 (2006).
2. The term "mixed" is commonly used to describe international tribunals that combine
elements of both civil and common law systems while the term "hybrid" is now used to refer to
tribunals which combine both national and international law and procedure. See Sarah M.H.
Nouwen, 'Hylmd Courts': The Hylmd Category of a New Type of International Crimes Courts, 2 UTRECHT
L.R. 190, 190 (2006).
3. "In international proceedings the adversarial system has basically prevailed, but without a
jury. This system has been predominant since 1945, when the procedure for the IMT [the
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article aims principally to demonstrate that the practice of selfrepresentation, which has scant legitimacy even in the common law
system, is absolutely incompatible with the structural and normative
groundings of the emerging international criminal justice system.
A certain unreconstructed mystique has shielded the right of selfrepresentation over the years. The iconic image it presents is one of a
simple citizen, typically a social outcast or a proud political dissident,
pleading for simple justice before a jury of his peers. It is a portrait of
direct democracy at work, a self-represented individual throwing off
the formal trappings of the state and its lawyers to present an unmediated narrative in the courtroom. It heralds the simple force of truth
against the overly rationalized power of the state, the freedom to say
"no" to both the power and the process of the prosecution. It champions a nostalgic sense of the simple liberties due the common man even
in an age of highly regulated complexity. Unfortunately, this mystique
presents an iconography that is not well grounded in either an historical or a normative truth. It is, as we shall see, a false construct that
reverses and subverts the reality of the almost entirely negative historical experience with the practice of self-representation in the adversarial
setting of the common law jury trial.
This article argues that the current practice of self-representation is
not simply a quaint or benign anachronism of the common law jury
trial system. Rather it is, within the context of any mature and professionalized criminal justice system, a deeply cynical and irresponsible
condescension to the accused. The best that can be said of the practice
is that at the lower borders of any criminal justice system-where the
cases typically bear no significant consequence-permitting pro se
representation may not produce a harmful consequence. 4 But there
are no genuinely redeeming consequences to the practice. More
commonly, as will be described below, the practice makes a broad and
profoundly negative contribution to the cause of justice-particularly
with regard to the accused himself. 5

Nuremberg Tribunal] was being discussed in London." ANTONIO CAsSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw 376 (2003).
4. For a recent account of a typical below-radar trial involving a perfectly obnoxious
defendant in a silly case where the defendant self-represented at a bench trial and was acquitted by
the court, seeAnemona Hartocollis, A Noisy Train, a Fed-Up RUier and a Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 2008, at Bl.
5. Professor Hashimoto has recently conducted a study of records in both federal and state
courts to demonstrate that the choice to self-represent is not necessarily irrational because of the
widespread incompetence of assigned defense counsel. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right

2009]

921

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

In more serious cases civil law systems generally forbid selfrepresentation. This is a non-controversial position that is premised on
the fairness and reliability of the civil law system itself. This article does
not advocate such a complete prohibition within the international
criminal justice system where the primary template is the common law
adversarial (but nonjury) trial system. Rather, I argue in favor of
reducing the status of the practice from a right to a privilege. The most
obvious analog for this restructuring is the practice of trial by jury in the
American criminal system. The American defendant has a nearabsolute right to be tried by jury but he has no right to be tried without
a jury. 6 American trial judges have broad discretion to deny the
defendant the privilege of being tried by the court itself. The bitter
morass of self-representation would be largely resolved if the trial
courts had the same discretionary authority to deny the defendant the
privilege of being tried without counsel, and to permit it only when,
and under what circumstances, it would be appropriate.
Recent scholarship on the history of the common law jury system has
indirectly contributed a great deal to our understanding of the actual
role of self-representation during that history, revealing not only more
of the actual practice of self-representation but also of its very purpose. 7

of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Prose Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REv. 423 (2007). The
study relies upon the extant literature to demonstrate the "breathtakingly low" competence of
counsel and conducts a statistical study of the incidence and outcomes of pro se cases to suggest
that prose defendants themselves do not appear to be directly harmed by rejecting such counsel.
Id. at 467. The available data do not support a more controlled study that would have generated
direct findings as to cause and effect of self-representation, as very generously conceded by
Professor Hashimoto. The study provides no evidence of any positive reason for electing to
proceed pro se-except perhaps for the questionable desire to present a non-legal "ideological
defense"-as opposed to the strictly negative incentive of avoiding incompetent counsel. Id. at
473. This study marks a significant contribution to a better understanding of the present posture
of self-representation and the various negative incentives that may drive it. It is, however, a serious
and ironic misreading of Professor Hashimoto's study to suggest that it demonstrates that all is
basically well in prose land, as Justice Breyer appears to do in the recent case of Indiana v. Edwards,
128 S. Ct. 2379, 2388 (2008).
6. Singerv. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
7. There have been several excellent accounts of the history of the right to jury trial, see, e.g.,
WILLIAM FORSYill, HisrORY OF TRIAL BY JURY ( 1852), and the right to counsel, see, e.g., WILLIAM M.
BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS ( 1955)' but there has been virtually no direct
study of the actual role and status of self-representation throughout this multi-century history. The
most recent contribution to this literature by John Langbein provides the most vivid and
well-documented account of the actual role of self-representation as a polar restraint on the
development of a right to counsel as well as the full panoply of rights now associated with the
modem adversarial criminal proceeding.JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL
TRIAL (2003).
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In the earliest stages of the common law trial system the accused was
not permitted to present much .in the way of an actual forensic defense
to the charges. When the accused did finally gain permission to present
such a defense he was not permitted to be represented by counsel, to
call witnesses or even to testify under oath in his own behalf. He was
permitted only to appear personally at trial and to provide direct
responses to the evidence offered against him. "In short, the defendant's position was one of standing alone without counsel, books, the
means of procuring evidence or the right to offer evidence which he
did possess." 8 The purpose of self-representation was to promote
self-incrimination. 9 Self-representation began, in other words, as the
default position that resulted from the denial of any other rights of fair
trial or representation.
As the accused slowly accumulated greater trial rights, most critically
the right to be represented by counsel, self-representation continued as
the default position only because most defendants could not afford
counsel and there was no effective right to assigned counsel. The slow
demise of self-representation began among the privileged classes who
were not only the first to be afforded the right to counsel but also the
first to be able to afford counsel. 10 Progress towards a fair trial for the
accused in the common law system has therefore been measured
primarily in terms of the slow but steady movement away from selfrepresentation and towards the provision of professional counsel.
Recent scholarship has demonstrated that the normative gloss of the
common law courts that had long supported the default status of
self-representation is therefore best understood as a post hoc rationalization for a practice that was always recognized (quite openly in the
earliest era 11 ) as one that severely compromised the accused's ability to

8. Joseph Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv.
1175, 1191 (1970).
9. "[T)he rationale for the rule against defense counsel was to pressure the accused to serve
as an informational resource at trial." LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 48.
10. "Before 1695 one accused of treason or misprision of treason had no right to retain
counsel, but in that year Parliament chose to create a preferred position for such defendants ....
Members of Parliament were all 'political' figures, and the reform in 1695 reveals in eloquent
terms their ideas of a fair judicial proceeding in a case where they might be involved personally."
BEANEY, supra note 7, at 9.
11. "[T) he very Speech, Gesture and Countenance, and Manner of Defense of those who are
Guilty, when they speak for themselves, may often help to disclose the Truth, which probably
would not be so well discovered from the artificial Defense of others speaking for them." 2
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A 'TREATISE ON THE Pu.As OF THE CROWN (London 1721), cited in LANGBEIN,
supra note 7, at 35.
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defend himself.
Ironically, the rather unlikely recognition of this practice as a fundamental right that inured to the interests of the accused did not fully
arrive until 1975 in Faretta v. California. 12 This was a full decade after the
Warren Court had finally completed the long march of the Twentieth
Century to securing for all defendants in all criminal cases a guaranteed Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel. Prior to
Faretta, no case had ever held that the Sixth Amendment also provided
a guaranteed right to self-representation. The text of the amendment
does not refer to such a right. There was also, as of 1975, no real
call-either in the lower courts, the academic literature or the public
narrative-to recognize such a right. The sudden recognition of a Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation therefore was an ipse dixit
creation of the Supreme Court.
Yet there was, to be sure, a good deal of apparent support for the
opinion in Faretta. Since no state had adopted a guaranteed right to
counsel for all defendants, the widespread practice of self-representation by default had continued until well into the middle of the last
century. Although a battle raged over extending the right to counsel, a
"right" to self-representation remained a non-issue. Therefore, the
colonial-era statutes and constitutional provisions that referred to a
right to represent oneself in person remained essentially dormant. This
silence could be construed to portray a long-term positive commitment
to the practice of self-representation rather than an enduring negative
commitment to deny guaranteed counsel. However well intentioned,
Faretta largely misread the common law history it relied upon and
constructed a false ideal for a practice that was utterly at odds with the
new constitutionally driven system of defaults being developed for the
American practice of criminal jury trial. The result of this selfgenerated conflict between a guaranteed right both to counsel and to
self-representation has been recurrent spectacles of self-represented
defendants in serious trials who are either mentally ill, sadistic opportunists, pathetic voyeurs, nihilistic martyrs or just plain fools. This
development has created a dismal state of affairs throughout the
criminal justice system that is almost exclusively supported and maintained by the Supreme Court.
The right of self-representation entered international law in the
immediate post-Nuremberg era as one of the "rights of the accused"
recognized in the seminal human rights document, the International

12. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 13 This was, of
course, law largely without context, for -there were no subsequent
international criminal tribunals until the early 1990s with the creation
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (IC1Y) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (!CTR) .14 The exercise of
the international right to self-representation first occurred before
these two tribunals and several subsequent tribunals, where it was
quickly exposed as a right without a reason. In particular, it has greatly
disrupted and compromised the work of the IC1Y, the tribunal with the
foremost influence to date on the creation of a viable international
criminal justice system. It will almost certainly wreak even greater havoc
on the integrity and efficiency of the operations of the ICC, the new
standard-bearer for the promotion of international accountability for
the most egregious violations of fundamental human rights. 15 The time
has already passed to revoke the right from the rules of the various
tempor4ry tribunals. But it is both timely and essential to remove the
right from the statute of the ICC, the first and only permanent court of
international criminal justice.
This article will demonstrate the clear vacancy of continuing to
recognize the right of self-representation in virtually any mature legal
system, but most significantly within the apparatus of fundamental
rights before the International Criminal Court. Part II presents the
essential argument. It will engage the more recent historical scholarship to discredit the broad mystique that has supported the common
law claim to an individual right of self-representation. This Part will
demonstrate that the practice of self-representation began as an instrument of the state. designed to compromise, not serve, the interests of
the accused. Whatever derivative interests of the accused the practice
may have once served have diminished over time to the point of
non-existence. Self-representation is not an inherent guarantee of
individual autonomy essential to the philosophy of the adversarial
system. It is a practice which was carelessly recognized as a constitutional right in America and is now increasingly in disrepute within the
judiciary and the scholarly literature. It is presently a practice which

13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(d), GA Res. 2200A
(XXI) Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.AS. No. 14668, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter "ICCPR"].
14. The ICIY was established in May 1~93. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N.Doc. S/RES/827 (May25, 1993). The ICTR was established in November 1994.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
15. The ICC was established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. l,July 17, 1998, 371.L.M. 999.
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stands in fundamental conflict with the legitimate interests of both the
accused and the legal system itself. It is a practice that should therefore
be severely circumscribed by any system aspiring to a more advanced
degree of fundamental fairness and integrity.
Part III will demonstrate how the right, even within the context of
modern Anglo-American jury trials, has become an odious impediment
to providing a fair and reputable trial to the accused. The Supreme
Court has created a right-based doctrine that focuses almost entirely
upon a false construct of the putative libertarian interests of the
accused. The point advanced in this Part is that it is not only the
accused who becomes the aphoristic fool; the entire trial proceeding
and all of its primary participants are equally implicated in and
compromised by the essential foolishness. This Part will largely let the
actual trial stories of some of the more notable cases speak for themselves to demonstrate the pervasive harms generated by the right.
Part IV will explain how the traditional norms associated with the
right of self-representation have absolutely no transfer application to
the unique structural and normative schemes of the international
criminal tribunals. A right of self-representation entered international
law as part of a near-wholesale adoption of the common law adversarial
trial at Nuremberg and has only recently been vetted within the unique
and disparate context of the emerging international system of criminal
justice. This Part will demonstrate that even within the short history of
the temporary international tribunals, the right has already clearly
established its ability to frustrate and compromise the pursuit of a fair
and reputable trial for some of the most horrendous crimes of the era.
II.

THE ~OAD TO FAREITA

Self-representation has always served the interests of the state and
rarely, if ever, the interests of the accused. The practice of selfrepresentation began as a mere incidental feature of the primitive
common law jury system. But the practice was maintained long after the
more rudimentary stages of jury trial developments, due to its enormous political utility to the state. As the common law jury practice
matured and became increasingly complex, a right of counsel became
critical to a fair trial. It also enabled the development of other nascent
rights dependent upon the presence of counsel, such as the right to
remain silent at trial. The default status of self-representation was not
vanquished in America until the emergence of a guaranteed right to
counsel in the middle of the last century. Ironically, it was not until
after these protracted developments that the Supreme Court decided
that virtually every criminal defendant in America had an absolute
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right to surrender these new and fundamental rights and proceed to
trial without the benefit of counsel.
A.

The Early Period

In the early period of the criminal jury trial, beginning in the
Thirteenth Century, the accused possessed no right to testify in his own
behalf, to confront his actual accusers, to compel witnesses for his
defense or to be represented by counsel. 16 He appeared personally
before the trial jury, which was often composed of members of the
same self-informed panel that had already voted to initiate the charges
(the forerunner to today's grand jury), 17 and was subject to questioning
by both the judge and jurors. 18 "The accused conducted his own
defense, as a running bicker with the accusers. Replying in person to
the charges and the evidence against him was the only practical means
of defense that the procedure allowed." 19 Modest allowances to this
primitive adversarial practice were introduced over time but the common law of England clung to the belief that an individual accused of
crime should not be aided by counsel in presenting his case to the jury.
Counsel was permitted to assist the defendant with regard to technical
matters of law but was strictly prohibited from appearing at trial to
argue the factual case to the jury. 20 Indeed, it was not until 1836, by
statute, that the English criminal defendant was permitted the right to
have counsel appear on his behalf with regard to matters of both law
and fact. 21 This restriction on counsel and the obligation of the
defendant to appear and answer orally was a well-determined feature of
English criminal procedure throughout this period. 22 The recent
historical scholarship of John Langbein regarding the critical transition of the common law jury trial from a simple accusatorial to a highly
adversarial proceeding has demonstrated the overriding purpose of

16. "One accused of a capital offense-and all serious offenses were capital-faced his
accusers without witnesses, without counsel, even without assurance of opportunity to question
the witnesses against him." J.A. GRANT, OUR COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION 1 (1960).
17. LEONARD W. l.Ew, THE PALIADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF THE TRW. BY JURY 18-19
(1999).
18. LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 319.
19. Id. at 253.
20. Id. at 26-28.
21. 6&7 Wil. 4, c. 114 (1836).
22. "English criminal procedure was for centuries organized on the principle that a person
accused of having committed a serious crime should not be represented by counsel at trial."
LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 10.
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the early insistence on an uncounseled defendant: "allowing him
counsel would work to his advantage by hampering the trial court's
ability to convict him if he were guilty." 23
The common law courts were prone to rationalizing this punitive
restriction as a protocol designed to benefit the accused. One common
rationale for denying counsel was that, as to matters of fact, the accused
was better informed than any counsel could be and tl}erefore he would
be disadvantaged by counsel. 24 A common, related, assertion was that
the guiltless defendant who was first confronted directly by his accusers
at trial and forced to respond spontaneously was put in a better
position to reveal his earnest claims of innocence before the jury. 25 The
common law courts also asserted that the defendant did not require
counsel since the burden was placed upon the Crown to prove its
charges and, once proven, it was futile for the defendant to deny
them. 26 This was claimed despite the fact that, as Langbein has demonstrated, the entire system of trial .and pretrial procedures inaugurated
during the reign of Queen Mary (1553-58) was stacked heavily and
presumptively in favor of the Crown. 27 But perhaps the most bold and
self-satisfied rationale of the common law courts for denying counsel
was that the unrepresented accused was in fact better protected by the
court itself acting in its guardian of law capacity. "This rule may appear
somewhat strict and severe, as the crown has always the benefit of
counsel to marshal its evidence, and state the case to the jury; but is, in
some degree, attempted to be explained by the maxim, that the judge is
to be counsel for the prisoner." 28 It is not difficult to surmise, given the
tilt of the early scales of justice, that the court-as-counsel was hardly
likely to be effective:
This supposedly neutral pos1tion of the judge furnished an
excuse, however, for continuing the practice of denying coun-

23. Id. at 35.
24. Id. at 33.
25. "[T]he Simplicity and Innocence, artless and ingenuous Behavior of one whose conscience acquits him, ha[s] something in it more moving and convincing than the highest
Eloquence of Persons speaking in a Cause not their own." HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 400.
26. "[T]he proof belongs to [the crown] to make out these intrigues of yours; therefore you
need not have counsel, because the proof must be plain upon you, and then it will be in vain to
deny the conclusion." R. v. Edward Coleman, (1678) 7 ST. TR. 1, 14 (K.B.), cited in 1 JAMES
FITzJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGlAND 382 (London, MacMillan 1883).
27. LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 40.
28. J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 407 (2d ed., London, A.J. Valpy
1816).
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sel in felonies, and the reason commonly given was that the
judge was impartial and looked with equal suspicion on both
sides in a !=riminal action, with the further explanation that a
criminal proceeding was so simple that any man could understand what was being done. Another reason, though certainly
not stated openly at the time, was the view that the de'fendant,
having been indicted as an enemy of the king, was at least half
guilty and that all aids should be furnished to the king, whose
security, at any rate during the seventeenth century, was more
important than that of the individual accused. 29
The restriction on counsel in the early common law era was not
based upon a lack of or a general aversion to lawyers. 30 Already during
this early period a class existed of lawyers who were fully representing
clients in civil proceedings. Lawyers were also permitted to fully represent defendants charged with misdemeanors. The oddity of permitting
counsel in minor offenses but prohibiting counsel for serious crimes is
best explained by the more categorical separation between misdemeanors and felonies at early common law. 31 Virtually all felonies were
capital offenses while virtually all misdemeanors were punished with
only a fine. Misdemeanors were viewed more as civil offenses and not,
as with felonies, as a breach of the king's peace. When the felony
defendant attempted to refute the charges, he was effectively challenging an accusation made in the name of the- sovereign, hence the strict
limitation imposed on his ability to effectively impugn those charges.
The real designs of the early common law regarding the presence of
counsel were broadly, and ironically, revealed during a period when
the prohibition of counsel was temporarily replaced with the requirement of counsel. This occurred during the era of the notorious Star

29. BEANEY, supra note 7, at 11.
30. "During the era between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries a number of legal
institutions undeiwent changes that paved the way for the adversarial procedure. Lawyers rose to
prominence both as advocates and as judicial officers. At around the beginning of the 1300s
requirements were established regulating the education and conduct of those who would be
allowed to argue cases in the King's courts .... These .men formed the nucleus of a legal
profession that would eventually assert exclusive control over the judicial machinery." Stephen
Landsman, A Brief Suroey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 Omo ST. LJ. 713, 724-25
(1983).
31. "Illogically, in the least serious cases, English law had granted recognition of the
accused's right to retain counsel and to make a defense with his assistance. In these minor cases
... the state's interest was apparently deemed so slight that it could afford to be considerate
toward defendants." BEANEY, supra note 7, at 8.
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Chamber, which lasted for almost two hundred years until it was
abolished by the Long Parliament in 1641. The Star Chamber was a sui
generis tribunal that evolved out of the King's Council to become a
major instrument of the monarchy to prosecute seditious libel, treason
and other forms of religious or political dissidence. It is most commonly recalled in the modern era for its political treachery and its
secret, highly inquisitorial means of establishing guilt. What is not
commonly recalled, however, is its role in temporarily casting a false
glow on the early practice of self-representation. The Star Chamber
required every defendant to be represented by counsel who was willing
to vouch for the defendant's intended defense. By the Seventeenth
Century lawyers had become so deeply implicated in the treachery of
Star Chamber that the ability to escape representation by this politically
compromised caste of esquires had become a quest in its own right:
[B ]y the practice of the Star Chamber defendants were not only
allowed counsel, but were required to get their answers signed
by counsel. The effect of this rule, and probably its object was,
that no defence could be put before the Court which counsel
would not take the responsibility of signing-a responsibility
which, at that time, was extremely serious. If counsel would not
sign the defendant's answer he was taken to have confessed the
information. 32

The Supreme Court in Faretta acknowledged these anomalous practices of the Star Chamber, but then also cited the abolition of that court
as an affirmative embrace of the common law for the seemingly liberal
individualism of self-representation: "The Star Chamber was swept
away in 1641 by the revolutionary fervor of the Long Parliament. The
notion of obligatory counsel disappeared with it. By the common law of
that time, it was not representation by counsel but self-representation
that was the practice in prosecutions for serious crime." 33 However, the
Court overstated, if not misstated, the real significance of the abolition
of the Star Chamber. The prolonged struggle of the early era of the
common law was to gain a new right to be represented by counsel in
service to the accused, not to "gain" a right of self-representation. The
independent demand for recognition of a right to counsel of the
defendant's choosing continued throughout the reign of the Star

32. STEPHEN, supra note 26, at 341.
33. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 ( 1975).
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Chamber. 34 The abolition of the Star Chamber simply returned that
limited segment of the accused population to the punitive no-counsel
posture of those prosecuted in the common law courts. The objection
to the practice of the Star Chamber was not to the presence of counsel
per se but rather to the obligation to be represented by counsel
effectively in service to the crown. The abolition of the Star Chamber .
did not represent a resurgence of support for the entitlement of
self-representation. It instead represented the rejection of a punishing
imposition that was worse than no counsel at all. Self-representation at
early common law was always a default stemming from the denial of
counsel, not a libertarian aspiration of the accused.
B.

The First Era of R.eform

The breakthrough moment for the advance of a right to counsel
occurred near the end of the Seventeenth Century. A notorious series
of prosecutions for treason among political and religious dissidents
preceded the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The treason trials presented
a high-profile scandal of proceedings marked by the repeated spectacle
of an innocent and uncounseled defendant with no fair opportunity to
defend against a .politically interested court and crown counsel. The
Treason Trials Act of 1696 was designed to provide relief only to this
otherwise privileged class of political defendants by providing them
with a right to hire and be represented by counsel. 35 Even then, the
common law courts maintained a restriction on treason counsel by
preventing them from arguing the case directly to the jury. This
limitation was designed to maintain the pressure of the common law
for the accused to appear personally and vocally before the jury. The
Act was nonetheless a small but first crack in the common law wall
against trial counsel and it set in motion the long movement towards a
general right of counsel in all criminal cases.
Langbein describes this limited introduction of defense counsel as
the tipping point that marked the critical transition to the modern
adversary trial with its roster of attendant rights-all of which are
predicated upon the existence of counsel. 36 Beginning in the second

34. See, e.g., LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 11 n.2, for citations to the contemporaneous
complaints.
35. "The new mode of proceeding was introduced to seive wealthy grandees accused of
treasonable intrigues (mostly offenses touching dynastic succession or religious establishment)."
Id. at 3.
36. "Adversary criminal trial traces to the 1696 Act." Id. at 68.

2009]

931

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

quarter of the Eighteenth Century, the English courts, without enabling legislation, exercised their supervisdry powers to extend the new
right of counsel to felonies other than treason. This was a simple yet
dramatic paradigm shift in trial practice. The defendant was no longer
obliged to appear and answer personally at the outset and throughout
the trial. 37 Increasingly, the defendant was permitted to defend through
counsel and to remain personally silent at trial. 38
This provided the template for the emergence of a genuinely twosided, adversarial trial. The prosecution was required to make its case
without the benefit of the participation of the accused, which in turn
led to the development of a substantial one-sided burden of proof on
the prosecution. 39 This in turn promoted the development of a body of
evidence law, particularly that of hearsay, which operated to exclude a
good deal of prosecution evidence that would have typically emerged
during the "bickering" process of the self-represented trial. This is also
when evidence law developed its more profound commitment to
confrontation and cross-examination as the primary tools of truth in
the evidentiary process. This evolution of a highly adversarial, processdriven jury trial practice unfolded slowly over the Eighteenth and into
the Nineteenth Century in England. These same developments occurred more rapidly, and formatively, in the colonies.
C.

The ColOnial Era

The colonists immediately set out to forge a revolutionary response
to the perceived injustices of Crown prosecutions. It is certainly true
that lawyers in the colonies were hardly an exalted cadre of compatriots. The colonists commonly viewed lawyers as having both class and
political biases that rendered them obnoxious. But this hardly was
evidence of a preference by the colonists for self- as opposed to
lawyer-representation. Indeed, although the historical record of the
colonial practice is unclear, it is at least evident, as the Supreme Court
itself has recognized, 40 that the colonists took strong exception to the
English rule prohibiting counsel in criminal cases and almost immedi-

37. "[S]ecuring the accused as an informational resource was the central pre-occupation of
the early modern trial." Id. at 61.
38. "Only when defense counsel succeeded in restructuring the criminal trial to make it
possible to defend a silent accused did a workable privilege against self-incrimination within
common law trial procedure become possible." Id. at 278-79.
39. Id. at 261.
40. "The [English] rule was rejected by the colonies." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61
(1932).
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ately began to repudiate that practice. 41
The objection in the colonies was not to lawyers per se but to lawyers
who failed to represent the interests of the accused. 42 The common
practice of self-representation in the colonies was dictated not so much
by normative preference as by the fact that there was as yet no readily
available alternative. 43 As might be expected, the colonial reaction to
the ban on defense counsel was, if anything, more fervent than the
mounting opposition to the rule in England. 44 Self-representation in
the colonial era was, for most defendants, borne of necessity rather
than insistence.
Throughout the colonial era rules regarding representation of the
accused typically referred to a right to be represented either by self or by
counsel. 45 But the context in which these rules were adopted is critical
to understanding their relative status. The transformative initiative
represented by this development was clearly the recognition by the
colonists of a nascent right to counsel. Although they were typically
framed as procedural rights of an alternative character, they were not
normative rights of the same order. There is no evidence that colonists
insisted upon self-representation where counsel was otherwise available. Indeed, there was no need to champion a right for something that
had long existed, both at home and in England, as the default practice
of a system that had manifestly disadvantaged the accused.
The Supreme Court in Faretta was nonetheless at pains to conclude

41. "We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of the common law of
England, that when a man is on trial for his life, he shall be refused counsel, and denied those
means of defence, which are allowed when the most trifling pittance of property is in question.
The flimsy pretence, that the court are to be counsel for the prisoner will only heighten out
indignation at the practice: for it is apparent to the least consideration, that a court can never
furnish a person accused of a crime with the advice, and assistance necessary to make his
defence ... " 2 ZEPHANIAH SWIFr, A SYsTI:M OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 398-99
(Windham, 1796), cited in Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 828 n.35 (1975).
42. "[A] t the time of the War of the Revolution, in each of the American Colonies a Bar had
developed, composed of trained and able lawyers. The old antipathies towards the 'attorneys,'
against whom so much legislation had been directed, in the earlier years had died away, for the
character and talents of the men who undertook the practice of the profession had so distinctly
changed." CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 211 (1911).
43. "It is probably true that the English [no-counsel] rule combined with the early shortage
oflawyers in the colonies made it inevitable that an accused should defend himself in most cases."
BEANEY, supra note 7, at 18.
44. "There does seem to have been a greater awareness in American courts that an accused
who was undefended was at a serious disadvantage, and this awareness became keener as the
number of lawyers increased in colonial America." Id. at 25.
45. Farretta, 422 U.S. at 828.
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that the colonists had in the Sixth Amendment conferred constitutional
status jointly on both the right to counsel and the right to selfrepresentation. The problem of course was that while the Sixth Amendment expressly includes a provision that "the accused ... shall have the
assistance of counsel," it nowhere refers, either directly or by implication, to a coordinate right of self-representation. To complicate matters
further, the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was signed into law by the First
Congress just one day prior to the proposal of the Sixth Amendment,
provided that "the parties may plead and manage their own causes
personally or by the assistance of ... counsel." 46 Conventional statutory
analysis would suggest that, under these circumstances, the drafters
intentionally excluded the right of self-representation from the Sixth
Amendment. 47 The Court therefore resorted to a "structural" analysis
of the Amendment which found the dual privileges common to the
Judiciary Act and the colonial era rules of representation to be implicit
within the Amendment itself. 48
But there is a more direct and simple explanation for the ra,ther
glaring omission of any reference to self-representation in the Sixth
Amendment: the drafters recognized the right to counsel as a fundamental and transformative feature of the new constitutional order, while
the traditional practice of self-representation simply was not. There was
no generally recognized right to government-appointed defense counsel in the colonial era. 49 Therefore, for the typical colonist who could
not afford to hire a lawyer, representing himself was the only alternative. Thus, self-representation remained the default for those who
chose, for whatever reason, not to avail themselves of the new right to
hire a lawyer. The express reference to self-representation in the
Judiciary Act and the glaring omission of any such reference in the

46. Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
47. "[I)t is a general principle of statutory construction that when Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
48. "Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to selfrepresentation-to make one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily implied by the
structure of the Amendment." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.
49. "[W] e have as yet no proof that the actual judicial practice in many of the colonies was
more liberal than the English practice. Also, it is evident that no uniform practice existed
throughout the colonies at any time before, or soon after, the Revolution. Where provision was
made for the appointment of counsel, it was done in most states only for capital offenses." BEANEY,
supra note 7, at 21.
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Amendment, at the same historical moment, underscores the likelihood that the omission was purposeful rather than inadvertent. 50 The
drafters appear to have made a clear distinction between rights deemed
to be of a fundamental, constitutional nature and those procedural
rights, which were privileges of a lesser order.

D.

The Modern Era: A New Paradig;m Emerges

The remnants of the English rule prohibiting defense counsel did
not survive the founding of the Union.- The new federal government,
and each of the states as they joined the Union, recognized a right to
counsel in either a constitution or a statute or both. 51 But apart from
capital cases, 52 the guaranteed right to assigned counsel evolved slowly
over the next century and a half. 53 And even where provision was made
by statute or court rule for the assignment of counsel in non-capital
cases, the actual assignment of an attorney was widely neglected in
practice. 54 Thus, until well into the Twentieth Century, it was not
uncommon throughout the states for a defendant to answer a criminal
charge, including a capital offense, without the assistance of counsel.
But the Twentieth Century marked the gradual emergence of criminal law enforcement at the federal level and with it a national resettling
of the essential norms of criminal justice. Central to this was a mounting recognition of the paramount significance of the right to counsel to
all the other rights deemed essential to criminal due process. Powell v.
Alabama, 55 the infamous "Scottsboro boys" case decided in 1932, was

50. The Supreme Court was indeed tilting against several of the more standard protocols of
statutory interpretation with regard to the relationship of the Sixth Amendment and the Judiciary
Act.The Court "assumes that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation." Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990). Furthermore, "it is a general principle of statutory
. construction that when Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 452. ChiefJustice Burger
made the point in his dissent in Faretta: "[U] nder traditional canons of construction, inclusion of
the right in the Judiciary Act and its omission from the constitutional amendment drafted at the
same time by many of the same men, support$ the conclusion that the omission was intentional."
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 844 (Burger,]., dissenting).
51. BEANEY, supra note 7, at 25.
52. Id. at 138.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 138.
55. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The facts of Puwellare as follows: Separate groups of black and white
youths were riding a freight train across Alabama. The two groups got into a fight, following which
all but one of the white youths were thrown off the train. Two white girls remained on the train.
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the seminal and enduring event. On the morning of their trial, two
attorneys had appeared before the trial judge and offered to "assist" at
the trials but the Supreme Court subsequently found that the defendants "were not accorded the right to counsel in any substantial
sense." 56
The Supreme Court had never before held that the federal constitution required the state appointment of counsel for the accused in any
case. But the Court so held in Powell and thereby initiated recognition
of a new normative paradigm for the role of counsel in the modern
practice of criminal jury trial. The Court posed the question as to what
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required as a
minimal, fundamental guarantee for any defendant heard to answer in
"a case such as this" 57 and answered in a passage by Justice Sutherland
that has resonated in the right to counsel cases ever since:
What, then, does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included the right
to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party
asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. 58

Shortly thereafter, the train was met and seven black youths were arrested and charged with the
capital offense of rape. An Alabama statute required the appoinunent of counsel in capital cases.
At their arraignment, the judge appointed "all members of the bar" to serve as counsel to the
accused, yet no counsel actually appeared on their behalf. One week later, they were put to trial.
The seven defendants were tried in three separate groups and all three trials were completed in
one day. All seven defendants were convicted and sentenced to death.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Id. at 72.
58. Id. at 68-69.
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Powell was quickly followed by another extension of the right to
assigned counsel. In Johnson v. 'Zerbst, 59 the defendants were tried in
federal court for a non-capital offense and were denied appointed
counsel. The Court reiterated its analysis in Powell and concluded that,
at least regarding all federal prosecutions, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel guaranteed the assignment of counsel to all defendants,
regardless of the nature of the charge. 60
The Court reversed direction four years later in Betts v. Brady. 61 The
defendant was tried and convicted for robbery in state court. He had
pleaded indigency before the trial court but was denied appointed
counsel because in Maryland counsel was appointed only in cases of
murder and rape. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
Sixth Amendment rule of Johnson automatically requiring appointed
counsel in all federal cases was to be incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment rule of Powell and thereby made applicable to all
defendants in state court under the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine set forth in Powell. The Court acknowledged that" [e] xpressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument" 62 but
refused to so extend the doctrine of appointed counsel. Nevertheless,
the right to counsel continued to expand for the next twenty years,
albeit on a case-by-case due process basis.
But the slowly evolving due process era came to an end in the early
1960s with the advent of the Warren Court's "selective incorporation"
doctrine. In a series of cases over less than a decade, the Court
constructed a new national template for criminal justice by incorporating virtually every provision of the federal Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One of the first of those
incorporation cases was Gideon v. Wainwright, 63 a Florida state case with

59. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
60. "The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional
safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' It embodies a realistic recognition of
the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly, and
necessary to the lawyer-to the untrained layman-may appear intricate, complex, and mysterious." Id. at 462-63.
61. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
62. Id. at 462-63.
63. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). James Earl Gideon was charged with a non-capital offense and
requested the appointment of counsel. The trial court denied his request and Gideon was forced
to represent himself at trial. He was convicted; his state court appeal was denied; and, still
representing himself, he filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The high court
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facts similar to those in Betts., The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was so incorporated and therefore applicable to
all defendants otherwise denied counsel in state court proceedings.
American justice would no longer permit an accused to be forced to
represent himself against the state's modem prosecutorial arsenal. 64
Gideon affirmed that the "guiding hand" of professional defense
counsel was essential to the fairness of virtually any criminal prosecution, refuting the self-representation mythology of a David taking on a
Goliath. The structural significance of counsel to the modem adversarial contest has been repeatedly reinforced:
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistanc~ of
counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney,
whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to
ensure that the trial is fair. 65
Their presence is essential because they are the means through
which the other rights of the person on trial are secured.
Without counsel, the right to a trial itself would be "of little
avail," as this Court has recognized repeatedly. 66
This right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminaljustice. 67

appointed counsel to Gideon for purposes of his review in that court and subsequently decided
that Betts had been wrongly decided.
64. "Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere
deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to
prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief
that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
65. S~ckland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
66. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984).
67. Brewerv. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
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Without the help of a lawyer, all the other safeguards of a fair
trial maybe empty. 68
From humble historical origins in England and relatively modest beginnings in the country, the right to counsel has developed into the most vital of all the protections guaranteed to
criminal defendants by the United States Constitution. 69
The central point cannot be ignored: the deliberately amateurish
common law jury trial system has now evolved into a complex constitutional system of interdependent rights. This new paradigm is premised
on the assumption that counsel will always be available to the accused
to navigate this new constitutional labyrinth. The new system of rights is
now constructed as a house of cards that crumbles when counsel is
removed. The mere right to have counsel is no longer sufficient; the
actual presence of counsel is essential. The set points of default
performance have been raised and regularized for all participants in
the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of crime. The presence
of defense counsel is essential not only to the interests of the accused,
but also to the interests and integrity of the criminal justice system. The
outcome of Gideon underscores the ultimate point: on retrial where he
was represented by counsel, James Earl Gideon was found not guilty. 70
The right to appointed defense counsel now permeates the modern
system of constitutional criminal justice in many ways. One example is
the creation of the "Miranda rights" by the Warren Court in Miranda v.
Arizona. 71 Previously, the accused had no constitutional right to an
attorney outside the courthouse, most notably at the station house. In
Miranda, without even relying on the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme
Court held that the accused possesses a right to have counsel present at
the police station. The Court held that a person in custody at the
station house and subject to interrogation by the police had a Fifth
Amendment right to be protected against compelled self-incrimination. The only reasonable manner in which that right to remain silent
could be protected, the Court reasoned, was by recognizing an integrated right to have counsel appointed to represent the accused at the
station house.
It is therefore incongruous that only after the right to counsel had

68. William]. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 773 (1961).
69. JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT To THE AssISfANCE OF COUNSEL 45 (2002).
70. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 237 (1964).
71. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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been secured did the Supreme Court decide that the accused had an
absolute right to reject the assistance of counsel at the courthouse. "It is
thus no exaggeration to say that Faretta not only 'cut against the grain'
of the Court's previous Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but also
undermined foundational principles of modern American criminal
procedure." 72
E.

Faretta

The Supreme Court in Faretta held that all defendants have a
co-equal Sixth Amendment right either to be represented by counsel
or to self-represent. It reversed a California Supreme Court case which
ruled that a right of self-representation was inconsistent with the
modern, guiding-hand paradigm of criminal justice developed by the
Supreme Court. The Faretta Court relied primarily upon a misreading
of the foregoing history of the practice but also offered additional
support grounded in the libertarian concept of individual "free choice"
or "autonomy." But neither the historical nor the philosophical rationales proffered by the Court are able to withstand analysis.
It was no accident that the case arose in California. A long series of
negative experiences with self-represented defendants in that state had
led both the legislature and the state judiciary to review whether
California should continue in the post-Gideon era to recognize a right of
self-representation. 73 Both the state constitution and statutes provided
for the right. 74 The judiciary acted first, prior to the enactment of
several changes to state constitutional and procedural law. In the 1972
case of Peop!,e v. Sharp, 75 the trial court prevented the defendant from
·firing his attorney on the day of trial and appearing pro se. The
California Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The court held that
"there is no express language in any of [the Sixth Amendment's]
provisions which reasonably supports a right of prose representation. "76
After a lengthy and strained review of state law, the court concluded
that "neither the federal nor the California Constitution makes specific
·provision for self-repre.sentation as a constitutionally protected right in

72. RobertE. Toone, ThelncoherenceoJDefendantAutonomy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 621, 650 (2005).
73. See generally Mark S. Dodson, Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972,
61 CAL. L. REv. 377 (1973).
74. Both the California Constitution and the Penal Code provide that a defendant had the
right "to appear and defend in person and with counsel." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 686 (West 2008).
75. 499 P.2d 489 (1972).
76. Id. at 494.
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criminal trials." 77 The court relied heavily on a policy analysis which
further reasoned that "social and judicial changes which have taken
place during the almost 200 years require greater rather than lesser
limitations on the right of self-representation. "78
The California legislature was likewise undertaking broad measures
to negate any right to self-representation. In 1971 the California Senate
proposed a constitutional amendment to be submitted to the electorate that would remove the reference to a right "to appear and defend in
person" and add a provision that would grant the legislature the power
to require counsel in a felony case. 79 The legislature also passed a series
of statutory amendments, to go into effect only upon passage of the
constitutional amendment, which would require counsel in all capital
cases. 80 The sponsors of the changes argued that the right to selfrepresentation had become an empty and dysfunctional entitlement in
contemporary criminal trials:
This change in our Constitution, and the legislation which _it
authorizes, is necessary in order to ensure the defendant is
fairly advised of his rights during the trial, and at the same time
reduce the delays, reversals, and courtroom disruptions which
occur when an untrained person attempts to be his own lawyer
... Today's complex legal system leaves no room for the person
unschooled in law and criminal procedure . . . Not only is
self-representation harmful to the defendant, but it can work
havoc upon the judicial process. 81
The electorate passed the constitutional amendment the following
year, making California the first state to reject and remove any reference in state law to a right to self-representation. It was to be a
short-lived moment in the vanguard. Shortly after the new laws went
into effect, Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft, a non-capital
offense. Faretta requested to proceed pro se. The trial court initially
granted his request but then reversed itself and ordered him to
proceed to trial with counsel. The only reason Faretta provided for
wanting to dismiss his attorney was that he believed th~ public defend-

77. Id. at 496.
78. Id. at 494.
79. S. Res. ch. 240 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1971).
80. S. Res. ch. 1800 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1971).
81. Propositions and Proposed Laws, Together with Arguments, Primary Election, Tuesday,
June 6, 1972, at 8, available at http:/ /holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1972p.pdf.
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er's office was "very loaded down with ... a heavy case load." 82 Faretta
was convicted; the intermediate appellate court affirmed in an unreported opinion; the California Supreme Court denied review; and the
Supreme Court granted review by certiorari. 83
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, held that
Faretta had been denied his right to self-representation guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Faretta took the opposite
approach of the California court in Sharp to the traditional references
in both federal and state law that coupled a right to counsel with a right
to represent oneself. The Sharp court addressed a state constitution
that expressly referred to a right to "defend in person," yet the court's
interpretation led it to rule that the text did not actually confer an
absolute right to self-representation. Conversely, the Faretta Court
construed the federal Constitution~ which makes no express reference
to self-representation, to read such a right into the Sixth Amendment.
Neither opinion is particularly compelling.
The Faretta court had a choice. No prior case had held that the Sixth
Amendment guaranteed a right to self-representation. The most straightforward choice for the Court would have been to recognize that the
framers had gotten it right: the right to self-representation was a default
procedural right protected by federal statute but it was not a fundamental, constitutional right within the text or context of the Sixth Amendment. This approach would have upheld the California initiative as a
product of the Powell-Gideon right-to-counsel case line. It would have
permitted the states to review their own commitment to a right to
self-representation in an era when the Supreme Court had already
ruled, contrary to both the text and associated practice of the federal
constitution and statutes, that the demands of the modern adversarial
trial require that the states assign counsel to all defendants in all serious
cases. 84 The same historical analysis of the evolving demands of the
adversarial trial system that led to the requirement that the states
ensure counsel in all circumstances demonstrates the folly of selfrepresen tation in virtually all circumstances. 85 The Court could have

82. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
83. People v. Faretta, 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
84. This claim for individual state "autonomy" was directly presented to and rejected by the
Supreme Court in an amicus brief. See Brief of Ohio and 18 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208).
85. "The notion that criminal defense was a suitable do-it-yourself activity developed at a time
when the whole of the criminal trial was expected to transpire as a lawyer-free contest of
amateurs." LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 11.
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used Faretta to reinforce the preeminent command of Gideon to require
all states to provide all defendants with access to a defense bar that is
capable of effective representation.
However, the Faretta court opted for another choice which appeared
to assume that the due process-incorporation movement required strict
guardianship by the Supreme Court of any right that might reasonably
be attributed to the framers. A right of self-representation, while
fundamentally at odds with the Gideon court's recognition of the need
for a defense counsel's "guiding hand," was such a right. Furthermore,
the practice of self-representation had up to that point generated
virtually no concern or controversy within the federal system, thereby
giving it the appearance of a relatively inconsequential burden to
impose upon the states. 86
The Court relied almost entirely upon the "nearly universal conviction"87 for such a right found in the original, and unmodified, statutes
and state constitutions which consistently paired a right to counsel with
a right to represent oneself. The opinion treated the two rights as being
joined as equals and made no attempt to analyze their normative status
independently. The Court grounded this co-equal treatment upon an
historical analysis that was, as described above, misleading with regard
to the purported "fervent insistence" of the colonists upon an independent right to self-representation. Yet the Court relied upon this analysis
to conclude that the right, although not included on the express list of
rights of the accused in the Sixth Amendment, was nonetheless "necessarily implied" 88 in that amendment.
It is one thing to find an implied right in the Constitution located
either within an expanded reading of the text itself89 or within the
interstitial penumbras of the various textual provisions. 90 But it is more
troublesome to find an implied right when the opposite counterpart to
that putative right is exclusively specified within the text. The Supreme
Court had earlier confronted this circumstance with regard to another

86. "Presumably the occasions are rare when a defendant will plead ncit guilty and then waive
counsel. The paucity of cases where a defendant has done so suggests that since the case of
Johnson v. Zerbst [304 U.S. 458 (1938)] defendants will accept the appointment of counsel."
BEANEY, supra note 7, at 59.
87. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817.
88. /d.at819.
89. SeeMcMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("[T]he right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel").
90. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 ( 1965) (recognizing a right of association
within the penumbra of the First Amendment, despite that "[t]he association of people is not
mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights.").
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proVIs1on of the Sixth Amendment: the right to be tried "by an
impartialjury."91 In Singerv. United States, 92 the defendant had claimed
the right to be tried without a jury following his knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to be tried by jury. The Court denied his claim and
recognized that the waiver of a right is not itself a right. It is a privilege
that may or may not be granted depending upon particularized criteria. 93 The Faretta Court dismissed this juxtaposition of right-versusprivilege in a footnote, noting only that the Singer Court had recognized "that an implied right must arise independently from the design
and history of the constitutional text." 94
Three justices joined in two vigorous dissents 95 which appeared to
prompt a number of concessions in the opinion for the Court. Justice
Stewart acknowledged at the outset that the case presented "not an easy
question" 96 and later confronted the nearly universal conviction in the
Court's then-recent case law that the guiding hand of counsel is
essential to a fair trial:
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to
conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this
Court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no.
accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been
accorded the right to the assistance of counsel. [citing cases]
For it is surely true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that
the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair
trial. And a strong argument can surely be made that the whole
thrust of those decisions must inevitably lead to the conclusion

91. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
92. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
93. A similar circumstance developed with regard to the criminal defendant's right to testify
under oath at his own trial. Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the common Jaw rule
was that the defendant was incompetent to testify. The defendant was, however, commonly
provided with a right to make an unsworn statement. But when the defendant did finally gain the
right to testify, he did not retain a residual right to provide an unsworn statement. See Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
94. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 n.15 (1975).
95. Justices Burger and Blackmun dissented separately. Each joined the other's dissent and
each was joined by Justice Rehnquist.Justice Blackmun's dissent concluded with the memorable
observation that "the Court by its opinion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make
a fool of himself." Id. at 852 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 807 (majority opinion).
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that a State may constitutionally impose a lawyer upon even an
unwilling defendant. 97
Strong, but apparently not strong enough. The Court then made a
modest attempt to support its historically determined analysis with a
policy analysis of the right to self-representation. The right was said to
be grounded in the "inestimable worth of free choice" 98 recognized by
the Founders. After conceding that the right would actually benefit the
accused only "in some rare instances"99 which the Court did not
identify, the opinion maintained that the inestimable worth of the right
required that the typical prose defendant be made to bear the consequences of his foolish choice. 100 In other words, the Court argued that
the Constitution guarantees individuals the opportunity to cause probable and unnecessary harm to themselves at trial and then forces them
to abide the foolish consequences of their ill-advised decision.
Faretta's almost complete reliance on its flawed historical analysis to
determine the existence of a nght to self-representation allowed it to
virtually ignore any need to provide a normative account in support of
the right. The Court made only passing references to "that respect for
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law" and "the inestimable
worth of free choice." These bland rhetorical references would subsequently be interpreted by the Court as explaining ·that the right to
self-representation "exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the
accused." 101 The philosophical principle of autonomy has become a
powerful, if often ill-used, reference to support a broad array of
restraints upon the state. 102
The modern concept of autonomy is a mercurial construct, difficult
to isolate or pin down. It has become something of a catch-all reference, sometimes loosely applied, to identify a broad libertarian commitment to permitting individuals to control those decisions that have a
recognized (or at least arguable) normative value to the essential
conditions of individual self-identity. But i_t is important to note that it is

97. Id. at 832-33.
98. Id. at 833-34.
99. Id. at 834.
100. Id. ("And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his
choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'")
(quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan,]., concurring)).
101. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984).
102. "As autonomy has played an increasingly important role in modern moral and political
philosophy, so has it become central to the' Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence."
Toone, supra note 72, at 651.
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a normative concept that is itself normatively circumscribed. Autonomy
as used in the modern legal context is not a radical libertarian concept
that posits an existential freedom to be free from all state regulation or
restriction over any choices/ decisions thought to have a bearing on
self-identity. The choice at issue must itself obtain prior recognition as
one that is legitimately inscribed with normative value. Autonomy itself
does not inscribe all life choices with such normative value. The
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this limiting provision: "That
many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion
that any and all important, intimate and personal decisions are so
protected." 103
Examples of state control over intimate life choices are ubiquitous.
No one in a modern society could reasonably raise the banner of
autonomy to claim, for example, a right to self-operate in a public
hospital. This is simply not recognized as a legitimate choice. The same
is true in most jurisdictions with regard to the self-installation of an
electric service panel by an unlicensed individual in his own home. The
fact that it is only the handy homeowner who may be electrocuted in
the process does not render it a legitimate choice implicating the norm
of autonomy. Perhaps the most telling recent example of the distinction between the general norm of autonomy and the particular normative value of the choice at issue is expressed in the modern recognition
of the legitimacy of same-sex intimacy. Broad notions of sexual or
bodily autonomy have been used over the years to support a right to
various forms of sexual activity. 104 But the principle of autonomous free
choice had not been extended to same-sex intimacy until that very
sexual activity itself was recently recogni:z;ed as a legitimate life choice in
Lawrence v. Texas. 105
·
The essential question regarding the Faretta reliance upon the principle of autonomy is therefore: what are the fundamental, normative
values associated with an individual's choice to represent himself at
trial? Quite frankly, there are none. One searches in vain, in either the
case law or the academic literature, to uncover any identification or

103. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521US702, 727 (1997) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411U.S.1, 33-35 (1973)).
104. The seminal case is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
105. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). For an excellent account of the evolving recognition of
autonomy as applied to homosexual intimacy, see NICHOLAS C. BAMFORTII & DAVID A. J. RICHARDS,
PATRIARCHAL RELIGION, SEXUALITY AND GENDER: A CRITIQUE OF NEW NATURAL LAW 211-27 (Cambridge 2008).
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explication of the positive values associated with an individual having
the freedom to pursue such a course. The Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment case law, beginning with the iconic passage by Justice
Sutherland in Powell, 106 describes in detailed and compelling terms the
values inherent in a right to counsel. Similar normative accounts have
accompanied the touchstone cases regarding the recognition or expansion of other rights of the accused. But neither Faretta nor the subsequent self-representation cases have ever provided a meaningful account of what is to be positively gained or secured by recognizing such a
right, apart from vacuous references to the value of "free choice."
Indeed, to the contrary, Faretta expressly recognizes the almost certain
harmfulness and futility of recognizing a freedom to make such a
choice.
The concept of autonomy is contextual. It refers only to choices that
are deemed legitimate at the time of their making. "The concept of
autonomy has come to play a vibrant and resilient role in the Court's
greater constitutional jurisprudence, but as used in Faretta and its
progeny, it is an illusion." 107 And, as we shall see in Part IV, the
recognition of such a right of autonomy in the structural context of a
modern international court or tribunal is even more illusory. The
vacuous, indeed suspect, rationale for recognizing self-representation
as libertarian self-infliction is reminiscent of the early common law
rationalizations for the no-counsel rule. 108 The irony and inadequacy
of the Court's anachronistic analysis of the right was contained in its
own pithy summary of its holding: "In short, the Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as
we know it." 109 This of course referred to what we knew about the
making of a defense at trial as of 1975, forty-three years after Powell and
thirteen years after Gideon.
Ill.

THE MANY 1-IARMFuL ERRORS OF FARETTA

There is virtually nothing positive to report regarding the post-Faretta
experience with self-representation. There have been n~ redeeming

106. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).
107. Toone, supra note 72, at 655.
108. "Thus, from the outset, the Court's announcement of the right of an accused to proceed
pro se in a criminal proceeding was not free from skepticism about its legal foundation, moral
legitimacy and practical consequences." John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself
in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Seif-Representation Twenty Yean- after Faretta, 6 SETON HALL
CoNsr. LJ. 483, 496 (1996).
109. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
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stories of the triumph of a simple, old-fashioned justice; no realizations
of any strategic benefit or advantage to a particularized set of defendants; no recognition of self-representation providing a check or
restraint on the modem machinery of prosecution; no engaging or
edifying political encounters between the individual accused and his
state accusers; no reassuring expressions of pride in a system so
versatile and accommodating that it can ensure just results even when
challenged by a diverse cohort of individualistic contrarians; basically,
no gains in any quarter.
The Supreme Court callously rationalized the unlikely benefits of .
recognizing a right of self-representation by positing that it was the
defendant himself, the bearer of the right, who would bear the harmful
consequences of its invocation. The Court's caveat emptor philosophy
would excuse the state for the almost certain and substantial costs to be
imposed on the defendant. no But Faretta has caused real harm that has
been distributed on a broad and indiscriminate basis. It has presented
the courts with a constitutional commandment so unforgiving that they
have been forced to struggle endlessly, and fruitlessly, to contain the
damage. This Part will briefly summarize the already well-documented
doctrinal morass of Faretta and then focus more directly upon providing a broad portrait of the real and intolerable harms that arise from
that legal abyss. It will do this by highlighting for each of the various
harms one or two of the more prominent self-representation cases, all
of which tend to speak their harm quite well for themselves.
The Faretta Court was not unaware of the dangers its decision might
cause; the dissenters provided a prescient list. 1 u But the only danger
the Court chose to address directly, albeit in a footnote, was the threat
to the orderly proceeding of the trial itself. At the conclusion of a
paragraph explaining how the principle of the autonomy, or "free
choice," of the accused was supported by the fact that it was he who "will
bear the personal consequences of a conviction,"u 2 the Court entered
a footnote to explain that certain consequences, to the court itself, would
not be tolerated. The footnote recognized the possjbility of a pro se
defendant engaging in "deliberate disruption" and authorized trial
courts to appoint "standby" counsel who would stand in whenever the

110. "The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of
a conviction." Id. at 834.
lll. Id. at 838-39 (Burger, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932)).
ll2. Id. at 834 (majority opinion).
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trial proceeding was threatened. 113 The practice of appointing such
standby counsel became almost immediately ubiquitous 114 as well as an
irresolvable morass. 115
·
Nothing better portrays the fundamental conflict between the promise of Gideon and the guarantee of Faretta than the utter failure of the
American experience with standby counsel. The initial concept was
abundantly hopeful. The standby attorney was to be "seen but not
heard" 116 ; a lawyer-in-waiting precluded from prepping the case but
who could nonetheless step in mid-performance and take over the
leading role without hitch or conflict; a passive, unassertive assistant to
the commands of the defendant who had already refused her as an
advocate and who retained the power of refusal over all the attorney's
professional advice and services. But the inherent conflicts presented
by standby counsel surfaced immediately in the case law. When the trial
court appointed standby counsel over the defendant's objection, the
defendant would claim a denial of his Faretta right to unfettered
self-representation. 117 When the court did not appoint standby counsel, the defendant would claim an abuse of discretion by the trial
court. 118 When standby counsel became active in the trial, typically at
the request of the defendant, the defendant would later claim that
counsel had become too active in violation of his Faretta right. 119 When
standby counsel remained passive throughout the trial, the defendant
would claim a denial of his right to standby assistance. 120 When the
defendant permitted some trial involvement of standby counsel, some
courts treated this as a waiver of his Faretta right, 121 suggesting a

113. Id. at 834 n.46.
114. See THE BENCHBOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES, § 1.02 (4th ed. 1996) ("It is
probably advisable to appoint.standby counsel .... ").
115. See, e.g., Decker, supra n. 108; Ann Bowen Poulin, The Rnle of Stand/Jy Counsel in Criminal
Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the Criminal justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 676 (2000); Marie Higgins·
Williams, The Pro se Criminal Defendant, Sta7:1d/Jy Counsel, and the judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined
Rnles, 71 U. Cow. L. REV. 789 (2000) ;Joshua L. Howard, Hylnid Representation and Stand/Jy Counsel:
Let's Clear the Air for the Attorneys of South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 851 (2001).
116. Wiggins v. Estelle, 681 F.2d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 1982), reu'd sub nom. McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984).
117. See, e.g., McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173.
118. See, e.g., United States v. LaChance, 817 F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987); McQueen v.
Blackbum, 755 F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th Cir. 1985); Locks v. Summer, 703 F.2d 403, 404 (9th Cir.
1983).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762, 771 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Heine, 920 F.2d 552, 553 (8th Cir. 1990).
120. See, e.g., Molino v. DuBois, 848 F. Supp. 11, 12 (D. Mass. 1994).
121. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 588A.2d 305, 306 (Me. 1991).
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bait-and-switch cynicism behind the practice. Twenty-five years later
one scholar noted that " [ t] he role of standby counsel ... has never
been clearly defined. An appointment as standby counsel casts an
attorney into an uncomfortable twilight zone of the law." 122
The Supreme Court's sole foray into the minefields of standby
counsel occurred in the 1984 case of McKaskl,e v. Wiggins. 123 The
decision failed to provide order, or even direction, for trial courts
confronted with the protean disorders of the typical pro se proceeding. 124 In an extended yet remarkably irresolute opinion by Justice
O'Connor the Court attempted to both reaffirm the high-mindedness
of Faretta and likewise acknowledge the utter lack of profit in the cases:
" [ t] he right to appear prose exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of
the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at !,east occasionally, be the accused's best possible defense." 125 The transparent cynicism of McKaskl,e merely reflected, but did not alleviate, the rampant
cynicism that had developed around an unmediated right that had
produced nothing but wrong. 126
The most critical, and ultimately most harmful, doctrinal development occurred with the Supreme Court's 1993 ruling in Godinez v.
Moran. 127 In Faretta, the Court had created a right that assumed that a
non-lawyer charged with a crime was competent to assume the role of
trial litigator as to matters of both fact and law. This assumption was
proven false in the early self-representation cases. The principal question that roiled the lower courts for almost twenty years was what
minimal level of functional competence, if any, was required of a
defendant who elected to proceed pro se. 128 The Godinez court declared
that a prose defendant need only be sufficiently competent to proceed

122. Poulin, supra note 115, at 676.
123. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
124. "Despite minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, appellate courts still struggle to
reconcile the competing interests of the unskilled pro se defendant, who seeks to fully exploit his
Faretta rights, with the interests of the trial court, seeking the orderly and efficient administration
ofjustice." Decker, supra note 108, at 524-5.
125. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176 (1984) (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d. 245, 251 (6th Cir. 1987) (circuit court
disposed of the appellant's fair trial claim with the observation that "(t)he only thing that was
'unfair' about McDowell's trial was that he did not represent himself very well.").
127. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
128. "Godinez resolved two decades of a considerable disagreement among circuit courts."
Decker, supra note 108, at 518-19.
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to trial. 129 In other words, defendants who were actually mentally
incompetent to represent themselves could be found legally competent
to do so. The Court therefore upheld the conviction of a pro se
defendant who had been indicted on three counts of capital murder.
He was examined by several psychiatrists and found competent to stand
trial. He then dismissed his assigned counsel in order "to prevent the
presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing." 130 He pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to death.
The Court's Orwellian holding presented the issue of election in
inverse terms: the issue was not the competency to proceed pro se but
the competency to waive the alternative. The single, all-purpose competency standard the Court relied upon derived from the 1960 twoparagraph opinion in Dusky v. U.S., 131 a notoriously low standard. A
defendant may be seriously mentally ill yet still be found competent to
proceed to trial. Dusky's two-prorig, counsel-based standard requires
. merely that the defendant have a "rational ... understanding of the
proceedings" plus the ability "to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." 132 Dusky's minimalist standard
is itself premised upon the presumption that the marginal defendant
will be represented by counsel. The Dusky standard thus fails of its own
accord when a mentally suspect defendant is not represented by
counsel.
Godinez created an all-{)r-nothing conundrum for trial courts confronted by a mentally troubled defendant who insists upon appearing
prose. If the trial court believes that the defendant appearing before it is
not competent to provide a plausible defense at trial, either the court
has to find the defendant not competent to be tried at all or it has to
permit him to self-represent. A defendant who self-represents is not
required to, and typically does not, present a defense based upon his
own mental shortcomings. Therefore a trial court that permits the
mentally compromised defendant to self-represent realizes that the
jury will not be presented with any exculpating or mitigating evidence
of the defendant's mental state. "The right to self-representation,
recognized in Faretta v. California, effectively endows mentally ill defendants with the power to veto the decision to present evidence of their

129. "[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel
is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself." Godinez, 509 U.S.
at 399.
130. Id. at 392.
131. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
132. Id. at 402.
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mental illness." 133
The Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards134 has recently attempted
to step back from its unforgiving opinion in Godinez, which insisted
upon a singular "unified theory" approach to competency. The Court
did so in order to "alleviate those fair trial concerns" 135 of the lower
courts. Under Edwards, some defendants who suffer from "severe
mental illness" yet are still Dusky-competent-loosely referred to in the
opinion as "gray-area defendants"-may be denied the right to proceed
pro se. 136 The State of Indiana had petitioned the Court to overrule
Faretta in order to enable the "autonomy" of the states to maintain a
criminal justice system committed to "actual justice" as well as to end
the "romantic illusion that proceeding pro se may provide a better
chance at a favorable result." 137 Despite amicus briefs from eleven
other states in support of Indiana's petition, 138 the Supreme Court
"decline[d] to do so." The Court also upheld the holding in Godinez,
meaning that a seriously mentally ill "gray-area" defendant is still
deemed competent to waive counsel, plead guilty and be sentenced to
death-without ever presenting a defense to the charges. While the
opinion in Edwards provides the states with some escape from the rigid
grasp of Faretta, it will also almost necessarily produce another nightmarish struggle for the lower courts to conduct expert-driven "Edwardl',
hearings" to determine who qualifies as a "gray-area" defendant and
what measures will establish the minimal level of cognitive and performative competency required of such mentally ill individuals in order to
proceed pro se.
The Faretta doctrine has proven eostly enough but it is the actual
product, the cases themselves, that reveals the real and relentless harms
of prose representation.

133. Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for Fairness
and Against SelfRepresentation in the Criminal justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 164
(2000).
134. 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
135. Id. at 2388.
136. The defendant in Edwards had been diagnosed with a severe mental illness that
rendered him Dusky-incompetent for approximately six years before being found fit to proceed.
Id. at 2385.
137. Brieffor Petitioner at 60, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208).
138. Brief of Ohio, Alaska, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Indiana v. Edwards,
128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208).
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A.

Harm to the Defendant

Colin Ferguson shot and killed six passengers and wounded nineteen others on a Long Island Rail Road commuter train in December of
1993. There was no apparent motive for the shootings. He pulled out a
gun and began pacing up and down the aisle of the car, "firing
methodically, reloading when he ran out of bullets," 139 until he was
subdued by several of the other passengers. Ferguson, a black man,
claimed "a mysterious 'white Caucasian' gunman committed the massacre."140 Two lawyers who volunteered to represent him claimed that he
was temporarily overcome as the victim of "black rage" in a racist
society. 141 The trial court held a competency hearing at which psychiatrists testified that Ferguson suffered from a mental illness that rendered him delusional and paranoid and caused him to react violently
to his imagined persecutors. 142 The court nonetheless found Ferguson
competent to stand trial and therefore competent to represent him. self. 143
Ferguson dismissed the two lawyers who had volunteered to represent him and proceeded to represent himself at trial. He presented a
defense of misidentification despite the fact that fifteen witnesses
identified him as the shooter on their train. He referred to himself in
the third person before the jury and at times appeared in court wearing
a bulletproof vest. In his opening statement to the jury he explained
that he was charged with 93 counts in the indictment "only because it
matches the year 1993."144 He also claimed that the CIA had planted a
computer chip in his brain. 145 Ferguson did not present any evidence
of his mental condition. At the close of his rather bizarre trial, he spoke
to the jury for several hours detailing the various conspiracies against
him, after which the jury convicted him of six counts of murder and

139. Paul Viti~llo, In a Different World, N.Y. NEWSDAY,jan. 27, 1995, atA05.
140. Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kuns tier, So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane: The Colin Ferguson
Trial and the Competency Standard, 5 CORNELLj.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 19, 20 (1995).
141. Andrew Smith, DA Seeks Gag Order on Ferguson Lawyers, N .Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 2, 1994, at 11.
142. John T. McQuiston, Ferguson's Insanity Defense Angers Victims and His Lawyers, N .Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1995, § 13, at 1.
143. See People v. Ferguson, 670 N.Y.S. 2d 327, 328 (1998) (affirming finding of competency).
144. Stanley S. Arkin & Katherine E. Hargrove, justice Mocked When Madman Defends Himself,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, at Ml.
145. Larry McShane, Ferguson's Trial Antics May Set Stage for Appea~ Cm. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 19,
1995, at 3.

2009]

953

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

nineteen counts of attempted murder. 146 The trial court, describing
Ferguson as a "selfish, self-righteous coward," sentenced him to six
consecutive life sentences. 147
One of the more remarkable American experiences with a pro se
defendant concerned the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen
residing in America, who was arrested in August of 2001, on immigration charges and remained in jail at the time of the World Trade Center
bombing on September 11. In December of that year he was indicted
on capital charges of being a member of the 9/11 conspiracy as the
alleged "twentieth hijacker." 148 Moussaoui proclaimed himself to be a
member of Al Qaeda and a devoted follower of Osama Bin Laden but
he denied that he was an actual member of the 9/11 conspiracy.
Whether this was true or not, many believed that it would have been
very difficult for the government to have proven its case at trial. 149
Moussaoui was arraigned before District Court Judge Leonie
Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia. She appointed a team of
lawyers from the local Federal Public Defenders Office to represent
Moussaoui. He refused to cooperate with these attorneys and in April
2002, filed a motion to dismiss the attorneys and appear prose. Judge
Brinkema found him competent and granted his motion. The judge
simultaneously also appointed the same attorneys to serve as standby
counsel despite the lead attorney's unanswerable query: "He believes
I'm trying to kill him. Why would you require him to have anything at

146. Ferguson, 670 N.Y.S. 2d at 327.
147. "The result in the Ferguson case illustrates the unfortunate disgrace caused by the
Supreme Court's holding in Faretta." Decker, supra note 108 at 523. See also Richard]. Bonnie,
Ferguson Spectade Demeaned System, NAT'L. LJ., Mar. 13, 1995, at A23; George P. Fletcher, Colin
Ferguson s Client is a Foo~ N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 1994, atA32.
148. The 9/11 conspiracy involved four hijacked airplanes, each of which was commandeered by five hijackers except for one of the planes which had only four hijackers.
149. "Moussaoui was certainly connected to Al Qaeda, but his real value to the United States
may have been as a witness and not as a stand-in for the dead hijackers, who are beyond
punishment .... Moussaoui's arrest, one former CJ.A. official told me, 'was totally circumstantial.
They cast a wide net and the guy happened to be a little fish who got caught up in it. They know it
now. And nobody will back off,'" Seymour M. Hersh, The Twentieth Man: Has the Justice Department
Mishandled the Case Against Zacarias Moussaoui?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2002, at 56. "Some U.S.
officials remain doubtful about how much useful information Moussaoui has. One official familiar
with the investigation said he doubted Moussaoui was involved in the planning for Sept. 11
because he was 'a late addition' to the plot." Tom Jackman & Walter Pincus, U.S. Considers Talking
toMoussaoui, WASH. Posr,July20, 2002, atA12. See alsoJonathan Turley, TheCaseAgainstMoussaoui
is Far From a Lead-Pipe Cinch, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 30, 2001, at MS.
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all to do with me?" 150 Moussaoui then began a long series of vitriolic pro
semotions 151 and courtroom disruptions 152 directed at both his standby
counsel and the trial judge. In November 2003, Judge Brinkema
revoked his right to self-represent and reappointed the standby counsel
but Moussaoui continued to reject their representation and accused
the judge and his appointed counsel of engaging in a conspiracy to
cause his death. One of the more absurd conflicts this situation
produced occurred when the government was required to disclose
certain critical classified information to the defense. Since Moussaoui
did not have a security clearance, he-the lawyer on the case-was not
allowed to view it. Only his counsel, whether appointed or standby, was
permitted to view the material, but Moussaoui consistently exercised
his right to refuse to collaborate with them.
In April, 2005, after several years of protracted conflict and without
any cooperation or consideration, Moussaoui abruptly pleaded guilty
to the capital indictment. A jury decided against imposing the death
penalty. He was then sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole. The government case in this extraordinary prosecution was
therefore never challenged or even revealed and Moussaoui himself
terminated the proceedings without ever actually conceding that he
was indeed the twentieth hijacker. Moussaoui's trial, the only prosecution of an alleged participant in the World Trade Center bombing,
produced only an extended high-profile spectacle that made no contribution to either the historical record or individual justice.
To be sure, it is not unheard of for a prose defendant to plead guilty
to a capital offense and even to be sentenced to death without interposing a challenge to the prosecution's case. 153 This extraordinary breakdown of judicial responsibiliry is supported by the caveat emptor principle of Faretta: the defendant must bear the full risk and burden of his
freedom to choose. The Supreme Court made this clear in a case
decided several years after Faretta. In Lenhard v. Wolff the defendant

150. Eunice Moscoso, TerrurSuspect "Competent," ProsecuturSays, THEATIANTAJOURNAL-CONST.,
June 8, 2002, at lOA.
151. Among the many pro se motions were the following: Motion by Moussaoui to Stop
Undermining My Constitutional Right to Represent Myself, U.S. v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A,
Docket No. 211 (E.D. Va.June 24, 2002), available at http:/ /notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:Olcr--00455/DocketSheet2.html; Motion by Moussaoui To Prevent Standby Counsel from Sitting at
Defense Table, id.; Motion to Stop Leonie Brinkema DJ Playing Game with My Life, id.
152. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, judge Bars Moussaoui From Jury Selection: Interjections Again Prompt
CourtRemova~ WASH. Posr, Feb. 15, 2006, atA09.
153. Toone, supra note 72, at 630 (referring to this as occurring "with surprising frequency");
see also Ross E. Eisenberg, The Lawyer's &le When the Defendant Seeks Death, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 55 (2001).
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shot and killed someone who intervened in an attempt to prevent him
from robbing a Las Vegas casino. 154 The defendant was charged with
capital murder. At his initial arraignment on the charges, he informed
the court that he wished to proceed pro se and to plead guilty. He did
exactly that and, at his penalty hearing, he offered no evidence in
mitigation and also prohibited his standby counsel from doing so. He
was then sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the
conviction and sentence over a strong dissent that referred to the
proceeding as a "state-sanctioned suicide." 155 The Supreme Court
subsequently denied without opinion the application for a stay of
execution. 156
Ferguson and Moussaoui are examples of the two most common
types of pro se defendant: the mentally compromised and tfie egocentric grandee (indeed, perhaps the most common pro se defendant is a
combination of the two). The experience of these two cases and the
many others that they represent raises serious questions about selfrepresentation. How is it possible in a contemporary legal setting to
imagine a circumstance in which a pro se defendant would not be legally
harmed by his self-representation? Is it truly appropriate for any mature
legal system, in the name of an airy concept of "autonomy," to permit
someone to self-inflict serious legal harm in return for fome selfimagined exogenous benefit? Guilt alone does not establish a just and
proper conviction. 157

B.

Harm to Victims and Witnesses

Dean Schwartzmiller, a 65 year-old plasterer, was charged in California with molesting two eleven-year-old boys over a period of several
years. Schwartzmiller had been previously convicted on four occasions
of sex offenses with minors in several western states. Upon his arrest, his
home was searched and the police discovered an extraordinary 45~
page manuscript of log entries that catalogued his sex with young boys

154. 444 U.S. 807 (1979).
155. Id. at 808-09 n.l.
156. Id. The Supreme Court was later to expressly affirm a conviction under similar
circumstances in Godinezv. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
157. "There are clear detriments when defendants who, by most accounts, should not
represent themselves because of their mental or intellectual incapacities, are allowed to proceed
pro se regardless. The defendants in these cases are often sent to jail for long periods of time or
even put to death, while society's faith in the fairness of our judicial system is greatly undermined
by a feeling that these sentences are unjust given the circumstances." Sarah Livingston Allen,
Faretta: Self-Representation ar Legal-Misrepresentation, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1553, 1556-57 (2005).
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over four decades. 158 The prosecution alleged that he had sexually
abused some 250 boys over the previous 35 years. Schwartzmiller
exercised his right to represent himself at trial where the two boys and
six former victims, now 20 to 50 years old, testified against him. He
cross-examined each of those witnesses at length in "excruciating
detail" 159 before the jury. He asked if the witnesses remembered kissing
him and if they enjoyed the sex. 160 His encounters with the witnesses
appeared to cause agony with both the witnesses and the jurors who
were forced to observe. 161 In his summation to the jury, he read long
accounts of the graphic sex reported by his victims. The jury ultimately
convicted him on all counts and he was sentenced to 152 years to life. 162
Susan Polk, 48, stabbed her seventy-year-old husband 27 times with a
paring knife during the middle of a bitter divorce. 163 She admitted the
stabbing but claimed it was performed in self-defense and that her
husband died of a heart attack in any event. After firing two sets of
private attorneys, she elected to represent herself. 164 Her extraordinary
four-month trial seemed drafted for reality 1V. Two of her three sons
testified against her and the third, who testified on her behalf, was
himself tried and convicted during his mother's trial of beating his
ex-girlfriend in the same home where his father was killed. 165 The first
witness for the prosecution was her youngest son, who testified that
Polk was delusional and manipulative and that she had discussed for
years her desire to kill her husband. Polk then cross-examined her son
for four days regarding what the judge described as irrelevant family

158. John Cote, Serial Abuse Suspect Guilty, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 2006, at Al.
159. Carolyn Marshall, Serial Child Molester Receives Maximum Term in Califurnia, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2007, at Al 7 (quoting the prosecutor, Steven Fein).
160. Cote, supra note 158.
161. "One woman on the jury grimaced as Schwartzmiller continued his sexually explicit
questioning while the witness struggled to maintain his composure, frequently sipping water from
a paper cup and staring at the back wall of the courtroom." Rodney Foo, Pedophile Defends Himself,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 29, 2006, at Bl.
162. Marshall, supra note 159.
163. The case is unreported but CourtTV has compiled a series of reports. See Court1V,
Susan Pofk Murder Trial: Housewife Stabs Husband, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008).
164. John Springer, Woman Whose Lawyer's Wife was Murdered Wants to Defend Herself, CoURTTV,
Jan. 17, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/011306_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
165. Lisa Sweetingham, After Days of Rare Calm, Murder Defendant Begins to Create Stir Again,
CouRTTV, Mar. 25, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/052506_ctv.html (last visited Mar.
7, 2009).
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history and "minutiae" which did not concern the actual homicide. 166
As the cross-examination wore on, the judge observed that: "I believe
that this cross-examination is bordering on the abusive" 167 and "If you
were an attorney, I would have imposed sanctions by now." 168 The
jurors expressed their own discomfort with the defendant's exhibition.169 The trial continued in this manner for months. 170 During the
prosecutor's cross-examination of the son who testified in her behalf,
she made 30 personalized non-legal objections during the first hour. 171
At one point, when the trial audience burst out in laughter at one of the
defendant's performances, the judge was forced to reprimand them:
"Ladies and gentlemen, this is not for entertainment." 172
Polk had promised the jury during her opening statement that the
case would be a "nail-biting edge-of-your-seat thriller" 173 and she attempted to make good on her promise. She called herself to the stand
as a witness and then testified in rambling narrative fashion for more
than 17 hours without any questions being posed to her. She took the
jury through her life story, complete with childhood photos and

166. Lisa Sweetingham, Accused Killer Susan Polk Focuses on "Minutiae" in Cross-examination of
her son, CouRTTV, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.courttv.com/trials/polk/031306_ctv.html (last

visited Mar. 7, 2009).
167. Lisa Sweetingham, Defending Herself in Murder Trial, Susan Polk Incurs judge's Wrath,
CouRTTV, Mar. 21, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/032006_ctv.html (last visited Mar.
7, 2009).
168. Lisa Sweetingham, Susan Polk Accuses Police Witness of Manipulating Her Husband's Dead
Body, CouRTTV, Mar. 23, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/032206-pm_ctv.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009) .
·
169. Id. ("Several jurors have started openly showing their feelings for the defendant.
Eye-rolling, quick glances to one another, and barely concealed smirks increased during Polk's
many confrontations with the witness and the prosecutor.").
170. Lisa Sweetingham, After Three Tumultuous Months, Closings Expected in Susan Polk's Murder
Tria~ CouRTTV,June 9, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/060806_ctv.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2009) ("The thin, gray-haired defendant is a tireless contrarian. Her defiance of the
court's rulings, her acid-tongue accusations against the judge, prosecutor, court personnel and
prosecution witnesses, and her obsessive focus on every mischaracterization or potential slight she
perceives have caused frustrating delays.").
171. Lisa Sweetingham, Susan Polk's Outbursts PromptJudge to Suspend Son's Testimony, CouRTTV,
Apr. 28, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/042706-pm_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2009). Polk's objections included "Objection! Sarcastic and nasty" and "Objection! Randomly
ambiguous and unintelligible." Id.
172. Lisa Sweetingham, Accused Killer Susan Polk Goes Off-course While Questioning Detective,
CouRTTV, Mar. 30, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/032906_ctv.html (last visited Mar.
7, 2009).
173. Lisa Sweetingham, Susan Polk Launches Defense with Dramatic opening, CouRTTV, Apr. 26,
2006, http://www.courttv.com/trials/polk/042406_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
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excerpts from her diaries. 174 She told them she had psychic powers and
had foreseen the tragedy of 9/11 but was not able to prevent it from
happening because her husband was an Israeli spy. 175 On crossexamination by the prosecutor, she admitted that she had revealed in
an interview that she thought Winona Ryder might play her in the
movie version of her life and that Anthony Hopkins (aka Hannibal
Lecter) might play her dead husband. 176 The jury convicted her of
second-degree murder and the court sentenced her to the maximum
sentence of 16years to life. 177
These cases illustrate a common feature of prose trials: the defendant
becoming an abuser. The defendant as self-advocate in an adversarial
proceeding tends to abuse all of the other participants at trial, particularly his victims and accusers. He also becomes an abuser of the system
itself. His lack of professional skills renders him incapable, even if
willing, to comply with the rules of evidence and procedure. As a
non-professional, he is not subject to the standard controls of the court
or the embedded culture of the courtroom. Yet he himself has all the
status and privileges of an attorney when directly confronting his
accusers. This means that the pro se trial in the modem era cannot be
viewed as a quaint restoration.of the early common law "bickering" trial
described earlier. This is no longer a level face-to-face encounter; it is
now a one-sided bicker with witnesses forced to endure rude and
irrelevant-and often endless-questioning as the price for their testimony.
C.

Harm to the Attorneys and judges

Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth hijacker, never made it to
trial. Yet over the several years of his court proceedings he maintained a
steady stream of personal and professional accusations, in written
motions and courtroom proceedings, against both his standby attorneys and the trial judge. He was a non-lawyer in remanded custody and
therefore was never subject to direct sanction for his behavior. Mous-

174. Lisa Sweetingham, Accused Killer Susan Polk Takes the Stand in Her Own Defense, CouRTTV,
May 18, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/051706_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
175. Id.
176. Lisa Sweetingham, Susan Polk Defends Laughter During Television Interview as She Wraps Up
Her Testimony, COURT TV, June 2, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/060206_pm
_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
177. Lisa Sweeti.ngham, Susan Polk, Defiant at Sentencing, Gets Maximum Term far Fatally Stabbing
Her Husband, CouRTTV, Feb. 26, 2007, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/022307_sentencing_
ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
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saoui likened the judge to a Nazi, referring to her as a "furor," 178 and
accused her of being in a conspiracy with his attorneys to have him
executed. 179 He constantly ridiculed his standby attorneys and refused
to permit them to advise him on any matter, 180 reading aloud from the
Koran whenever they tried. 181 His lead standby attorney stated that it
was "almost an Eighth Amendment violation [cruel and unusual punishment] to require us to stay in this case as standby counsel." 182 But the
attorneys and judge had no other choice, given that they were dealing
with a capital defendant who had a constitutional right to refuse to
permit a serious defense to be made.
The lawyer who served as standby counsel at trial for Colin Ferguson,
the commuter gunman, endured a typical, yet particularly grueling,
experience. The attorney was himself an immigrant who had attended
the same high school as Ferguson in Jamaica. He initially joined the
defense as trial counsel and cared deeply to present a mitigating
defense for Ferguson based upon his obvious mental deficiencies. But
when Ferguson elected to proceed prose, his attorney was relegated to
advisor-only status and Ferguson refused to permit him an active role at
trial. Forced to sit as a passive hospice at trial, he could "only watch in
silence from the defense table, where he often slump[ed], clasping his
head as if trying to prevent it from splitting in frustration." 183 The
attorney described himself as "disgusted" with the experience and
threatened to walk away on several occasions during the trial. 184 He
likened Ferguson's self-representation to "a patient in a doctor's office
trying to perform his own spinal cord operation." 185 The attorney also
worried about his professional life-after-Ferguson "as indignities pile
on top of embarrassments, as his law practice frays, as his hard-earned
reputation is splashed with ridicule." 186
The appointment of standby counsel is a cruel, almost abusive,

178. Tom Jackman, Terror Suspect Allowed to Seek Foreign Aid, WASH. Posr,July 18, 2002, at B02.
179. Moscoso, supra note 150.
180. Motion by Moussaoui: Dunham Mind Your Own Pig Business: Motion to Keep Mad, Out of
Control Herd of Blood Sucker, out ofHal.a~ Pure Prose Land.
181. Jackman, supra note 178.
182. Siobhan Roth, Frank Dunham Odyssey: Strange Twists Come with the Territ<rry When You 're a
Lawyer for the '2dh hijacker', LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 2002, at 8.
183. Jan Hoffman, Hapless Lawyer, Thankless Job; Colin Ferguson's Adviser Sees Reputation and
Practice Suffer, N.Y. TIMFS, Feb. 14, 1995.
· 184. Evelyn Nieves, Our Toums: An Anguished Audience in a Theater of the Absurd, N.Y. TIMFS,

s

Jan. 31, 1995.
185. John T. McQuiston, LI.RR Trial Has Adviser 'Disgusteff, N.Y. TIMFS, Jan. 31, 1995.
186. Hoffman, supra note 183.
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assignment to limbo. The role contradicts and demeans everything
essential to the professional integrity (let alone the autonomy) of the
trial lawyer. The standby attorney is forced to play the fool's fool. No
matter how professionally abhorrent the scene becomes, the standby
counsel is prohibited from intervening unless and until the pro se
defendant calls for help, at which point, if it occurs, the standby
counsel is expected to step in and perform the miracle of rescuing the
defendant from his own malpractice. The concept of such a professional standby is nonsense and it demeans the legal profession to
pretend otherwise. 187
For the prosecuting attorneys, the experience is different, but not
much better. The prosecutor in the case of Susan Polk, the woman who
stabbed her husband, had to contend with an adversary who refused to
play by the rules and consistently got away with it. The trial judge
tolerated the defendant's repeated breaches of the rules. While the
defendant was engaged in prolonged and irrelevant cross-examination
of her son regarding various family pathologies, the judge only gently
admonished her: "[a] lot of time's bei.ng spent on minutiae about
events that are extremely important to you-again, I'm not trying to
tell you how to try your case-but my concern is that [the jury's]
attention will be lost for the important things." 188 The prosecutor,
therefore, had to conduct a trial in which his adversary continuously
interrupted his questioning of witnesses with non-legal objections and
yet was permitted to testify herself without any questions being posed
and without any apparent application of the rules of evidence. Per.versely, the prose adversary often benefits from preferential treatment
from both the trial and appellate judges who attempt to minimize the
costs to justice extracted by the pro se. defendant. 189 The Polk prosecu-

187. There has been some attempt in the recent literature to upgrade the role and the
practice of the standby attorney and thereby affirm the right to self-representation. The critical
premise of these articles is that nationally the provision of effective defense counsel is woefully
inadequate, thereby rendering more reasonable the defendant's choice to forego such suspect
counsel. While the inadequacy of defense services is indeed a national concern, it hardly seems to
support the conclusions that: replacing inadequate counsel with a less adequate non-counsel will
mark an improvement; inadequate trial counsel can somehow be made to perform more, rather
than less, effectively as standby counsel; eliminating even the possibility of an appeal on ineffective
counsel grounds is cost-effective; and encouraging more self-representation is an appropriate
policy initiative for the contemporary American criminal justice system. See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra
note 4; Poulin, supra note 115.
188. Sweetingham, supra note 166.
189. See Allen, supra note 157, at 1558 (analyzing the "circumstantial evidence that the
federal courts, in some cases, may be giving preferential treatment to convicted defendants .who
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tor characterized the.proceedings as "absurd" and a "farce" and pleaded
with the court for "guidance." 190 Later he responded to Polk's staccato
objections by slamming the counsel table in unison with each of them,
at which point the jury reportedly "froze" and the judge called a
recess. 191 Things devolved to the point where later in the trial the
defendant again accused the prosecutor of engaging in unethical
behavior, referred to him as a "moral creep," and said that he "ought to
be working in a third-world dictatorship." The beleaguered prosecutor
could only respond," [a] ctually, it might be preferable to being here." 192
An adversarial proceeding cannot proceed as such when the adversaries are not capable of behaving as such. The system simply implodes.
"[T]he Faretta right often corrupts the criminal process by replacing
trained and experienced counsel with an autonomous yet ineffective
advocate. One adversary, in effect, is removed from the adversarial
process in the name of autonomy." 193

D.

Harm to the System Itself

While serving time in state prison, Kashani Farhad managed to
commit a federal offense by fraudulently obtaining a number of federal
income tax retums. 194 He informed the District Court upon his arraignment that he elected to represent himself because he believed that he
could provide a "more effective defense" than his appointed federal
defender. Nonetheless, "Farhad's performance at trial was-as everyone involved except him surely expected-a complete disaster." 195
Farhad believed that his standby counsel, while seated at the defense
table, was compromising his pro se right, so the judge directed the
attorney to take a seat in the back of the courtroom for the rest of the
trial. "Farhad evinced an utter lack of comprehension of the proceedings ... He had only the sketchiest understanding of the roles played
by various people in the courtroom." 196 He made no objections during

represent themselves at the trial court level."). See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 846
(Burger, CJ., dissenting) (anticipating the development of appellate nullification following
non-affinnable pro se convictions).
190. Sweetingham, supra note 172.
191. Sweetingham, supra note 168.
192. Lisa Sweetingham, The Murder Defendant lsn 't Laughing, but Some Others Are, COVRTTV,
May 12, 2006, http:/ /www.courttv.com/trials/polk/051206_ctv.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
193. Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 133, at 169.
194. U.S. v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
195. Id. at 1102.
196. Id. at 1104.

962

[Vol. 40

SELF-REPRESENTATION

the prosecution's case. He put himself on the stand during the defense
case and tried to conduct the direct. by posing questions to himself. He
also provided the jury with a handwriting exe,rriplar during his direct
but the court subsequently had to instruct the jury not to consider the
content of the exemplar. Farhad had written: "Farhad is an innocent
man." 197 His closing argument to the jury was a "debacle" 198 which
ended with a twist. "Farhad wrapped up his summation in style, asking
the jury to find him guilty by returning 'a true verdict, a just verdict, that
the prosecution has proved its allegation.'" 199 The jury did just that.
Farhad was one of the many pro se cases that pass under the public
radar. It was not a particularly remarkable case and, under Faretta,
raised almost no serious issues of law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
conviction in a per curiam opinion. 200 The case is noteworthy, however,
for the remarkable concurring opinion of Circuit CourtJudge Stephen
Reinhardt. Reinhardt felt "bound by Faretta" to affirm the conviction
but concurred separately in order to urge the Supreme Court to
reconsider the holding in that case. 201 His argument was direct and
simple: the right to self-representation could not be permitted to
trump the more fundamental right to a fair trial:
[T]he Court has never directly addressed the argument of the
Faretta dissenters that the Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation would lead to unfair trials and unjust convictions. By now, it is clear that the dissenters' concerns have been
borne out. Farhad's trial illustrates the effect of this conflict,
one that the Court now has the opportunity to face squarely.
Under Faretta, courts have no occasion to assess the consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel on the constitutionality of the trial itself. Nevertheless, on the record, it is quite
plain that Farhad, like many criminal defendants who choose to
be tried without a lawyer, was convicted in a proceeding so
fundamentally flawed that, were it not for Faretta, it would
undoubtedly offend minimal constitutional standards of fairness. 202

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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Judge Reinhardt presented an impassioned argument that Faretta has
failed. He lamented the fact that courts everywhere were forced to
participate in these prose travesties ofjustice-and to do so in the name
of the Constitution. "We thus become a judiciary '\\j.th eyes wide shut'
... Such was the case here and, as required by Faretta, we have averted
our gaze-as one might from a train wreck or a freeway crash-from
Farhad's pitiful attempt to, in his own words, 'make a more glorious
kind of defense. "' 203 He reiterated the profound and pervasive commitment in the Supreme Court case law that the right to a fair trial is
fundamental to all of the other trial-related rights and argued that cases
like Farhad were a self-inflicted wound without justification. "It is, thus,
not only the defendant, who 'suffers the consequences' [from Faretta]
when a fair trial is denied, but the justice system itself." 204 The Supreme
Court did not accept Judge Reinhardt's invitation to reconsider Faretta
and denied certiorari. 205
International criminal courts and tribunals, following the precedent
set at Nuremberg, are dedicated in large part to constructing the
authorized record, the historical narrative, of the grave crimes sub
Judice. Given the circumstances typical of such criminality, that goal is
sufficiently challenging even with a functioning and competent defense counsel. But the foregoing stories of high profile pro se cases
demonstrate how self-representation threatens to fatally undermine
that goal. In pro se cases the primary story, the· critical narrative
witnessed by the public, becomes the story of the pro se proceeding: a
spectacle unto itself, often more immediate and compelling than the
underlying crimes. The American experience with self-representation
is not directly transferable to any other legal system, particularly an
international system. The exaggerated consequences in these cases can
perhaps best be understood as another unique aspect of the American
adventure in exceptionalism. But the American experience is at the
very least foreboding and indeed foretelling, as we will see below in
examining several of the. recent trials of the international tribunals. ·
IV.

THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT

Given the compromised history and experience of self-representation in the common law system, why would the nascent international
system of criminal justice make an informed choice to burden its own

203. Id. at 1102.
204. Id. at 1107.
205. Farhad v. U.S., 529 U.S. 1023 (2000).
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historic m1ss10n by adopting such a right for its own courts and
tribunals? The best answer, it would appear, is that the international
system never made such an informed choice. Self-representation slipped
unnoticed through the international door at Nuremberg, where the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal included a right to
self-represent but not a right to have counsel assigned. 206 The right
received no notice and was of no consequence since none of the Nazi
war criminals elected to represent themselves. 207 The right was thereafter incorporated, again without review or consequence, in the seminal
document that inaugurated the "rights of the accused" in international
criminal proceedings: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). 208 The ICCPR rights of the accused then became a
standard package of rights that were incorporated wholesale in a broad
number of newly established national constitutions and international
conventions. Again, the individual right of self-representation typically
generated little notice and no critical review. That same package of
rights was ultimately incorporated in the rules governing the interim
criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where the individual
right would receive its first consequential review outside the common
law system.
But at this critical point of first-impression review, the beleaguered
jurists on the international tribunals have found themselves in the same
compromised posture as American trial judges in the post-Faretta era.
They are forced to recognize an outmoded and dysfunctional privilege
that was carelessly enshrined in an earlier and much-removed setting as

206. Agreement and Charter, International Conference on Military Trials (London, 1945),
Art. 16 (d) available at.http:/ /avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack60.asp (stating that a defendant shall
have the right to conduct his own defense before the 'fribunal or to have the assistance of
Counsel).
207. Albert Goering apparently intended at the outset to self-represent but reversed himself
almost immediately. "There is astonishing newsreel footage of Goering, called upon to plead,
marching confidently to the microphone with a sheaf of notes for a political diatribe. Justice
Geoffrey Lawrence, presiding, curtly informs him that he must say either "Guilty" or "Not Guilty",
whereupon the camera catches the collapse of stout party as Goering obediently drops his notes,
meekly denies his guilt, and stumbles back, a broken man, to his place in the dock. To the modern
war crimes judge, that clip appears utterly nostalgic, in courts where defendants rant and rage and
boycott and generally treat their trial as a continuation of war by other means." Geoffrey
Robertson, General Editor's Introduction to Essays on Fairness and Evidence in War Crimes Trials, 4 IN1"L
COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE I, at 2 (2006), available at http:/ /www.bepress.com/ice/vol4/issl/artl.
208. ICCPR, supra n. 13, art. 14 (3) (d) ("In the determination of any criminal charge against
him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality ... to be
tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing").
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a near-absolute, and therefore unavoidable, right of both normative
and semi-immutable status. As might be expected, the same right that
has proven to be dysfunctional in a modern common law system is
incompatible within the structural and normative matrix of a contemporary international criminal tribunal. The initial encounters of the
temporary international tribunals with the right of self-representation
have already proven compromising-in some cases disastrously soand must not be perpetuated by the first permanent international
criminal court, the ICC, if that court is to have any chance of achieving
the formidable goals that have been set for it.
A.

The Initial Adoption

The history of the careless adoption of a right of self-representation
in the international arena bears many resemblances to that of its
American counterpart. The true right at issue was the right to be
represented by counsel; the "right" to self-represent was simply the
default, not the commensurate, alternative in a system where accused
individuals without resources had no right to state-assigned counsel.
The right to counsel and the right to self-represent were never either
normative or utilitarian equivalents. The drafters of the American
Constitution, as we have seen, did not even include a passing reference
to self-representation in the Sixth Amendment. 209 In the international
context there was never any discussion or reference to an independent
or transcendent value to self-representation. As with the American
experience, the critical concern was always with expanding and ensuring the right to be represented by professional counsel.
The drafting of the U.N. Charter in 1945 led to the call for the
drafting of an international bill of rights, reminiscent of the postconstitutional drafting history of the American Bill of Rights. 210 The
original working draft for such a bill, the so-called Secretariat Outline,
contained no mention of a right of self-representation. The first
submission of proposals by the United States contained a reference
only to the aid of counsel. 211 The discussions that developed around
the right of representation centered upon several issues: the right to

209. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)
210. DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CML AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: BACKGROUND,
DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATIONS 5 (2001).
211. U.N. Econ. & Soc. [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights Second Session, Proposal
Fur a Human Rights Convention Submitted b-y the Representative of the United States on The Commission on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/37 (Nov. 27, 1947).
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assistance of counsel; the right to counsel of one's choosing; the right
to assignment of counsel; and the light to notice of the various rights to
counsel. There appears to have been no discussion of the right to
self-representation. 212 The first mention of such a right appeared in a
proposed amendment submitted by the Philippines which reduced the
counsel rights to the right to defend oneself in person or through legal
assistance of one's own choosing. 213 This proposed amendment was
not acted upon as such; however, the language was subsequently
included in a joint proposal submitted by five countries, including the
United States, which was adopted. 214 That language is now included in
ICCPR Section 14(3)(d): Rights of the Accused. Despite the widespread adoption of this section in subsequent national constitutions
and international conventions, prior to its recent activation in the
various international criminal tribunals it had been interpreted by
· leading experts in international' law as providing a strictly qualified
"complementary" right of the accused to participate in the trial only to
the extent that it did not otherwise compromise the integrity of the
process. 215
·
It was only after this self-representation language entered the ICCPR
draft that the drafters finally agreed, after considerable debate, to
include a guaranteed, or subsidized, right to counsel. 216 It is therefore
fair to say that the modern system of international criminal justice has
entered its own post-Gideon era with a commitment to provide every
defendant with professional counsel to ensure an "equality of arms,"

212. "According to the official records, no discussion ensued concerning an absolute right to
defend oneself; rather the delegates were solely concerned about the right to access counsel, the
choice of counsel, and who pays for counsel if the defendant is indigent." Michael P. Scharf &
Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders have an International Right to Self-Representation in War Crimes
Trials?, 20 Omo sr.]. ON D1sr. REsoL. 3, 12 (2005).
213. U.N. Econ. & Soc. [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights Fifth Session, Draft
International Convenant on Human Rights, Philippines: Amendment to Articles 13, 15, 20, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/232 (May 23, 1949).
214. U.N. Econ. & Soc. [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights Fifth Session, Draft
International Convenant on Human Rights, Article 13, Chile, Egypt, France Philippine and United States of
America:JointProposa~ U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/286,(2June 1949).
215. "The right to self-representation complements the right to counsel and is not meant as a
substitute thereof .... Thus the court should appoint professional counsel to supplement
self-representation; conversely, whenever it is in the best interests of justice and in the interest of
adequate and effective representation of the accused, the court should disallow self-representation and appoint professional counsel." M. CherifBassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal
Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE]. COMP. & INf'L L. 235, 283-84 (1993).
216. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 14(3) (d).
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the civil/international law counterpart to adversarial due process. 217
B.

The Structural Incompatibility

Perhaps the most abiding assumption in the field of comparative law
scholarship is that the procedural rights and mechanisms of one system
are not appropriate for direct transfer (or "transplantation") to a
foreign system, however normatively inscribed those rights may be in
their native (or "host") format, unless demonstrated to be compatible
with the critical structural features of the recipient body of laws and
institutions. 2.18 We have already seen how the entitlement to selfrepresentation has become a dysfunctional appendage even within the
contemporary American constitutional system where the normative set
points, or defaults, have been structurally and materially transformed.
Yet this "vertical" incompatibility that has developed internally over an
extended period of time pales in comparison to the manifold structural
incompatibilities that are present with the "horizontal" attempt to
embed this right within the contemporary framework of an international court or tribunal. Whatever lingering value there may be to the
practice of self-representation in the American setting, it is a pointless
exercise in the international setting.
The number of pertinent differences between the traditional common law adversarial system and the new systems of international
criminal justice are legion. A comparison drawn against the stnictural
features of the new standard-bearer in the international forum, the
ICC, will make the point. We will emphasize here the following critical,
if not dispositive, differences: the trial proceeding at the ICC is not
constructed to serve as an essentially democratic institution. There is
no lay jury, no citizen "peers" of the defendant, in .a trial at the ICC.
There is nothing of a political or normative nature, not even a common
language, which is presumptively shared between the defendant and
his triers. There is no political sovereign at the ICC bringing a criminal
charge against one of its subjects; the defendant is more typically a
sovereign representative himself being prosecuted by a non-sovereign
entity. The ICC is a free-standing judicial institution; it maintains no
authority-political, social, economic, or military-independent of its
limited judicial authority. The mission of the ICC is not to render a

217. See generally Stefania Negri, The Principle of "Equality of Arms" and the Evolving Law of
International Criminal Procedure, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 513 (2005).
218. See generally Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM.J. COMP. L 163 (2003);
Alan Watson, Aspects ofReception ofLaw, 44 AM.J. CoMP. L. 335 (1996).
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politically acceptable verdict to repair an established social order but
rather to produce a literal verdict based upon an objective rendering of
the historical record. There can be no fair trial before the ICC that is
not independently grounded in that historical "truth." The libertarian
concept of autonomy has a highly reduced role to play in the ICC
setting, where the defendant is not making existential, self-defining
choices that have themselves been legitimated by a pertinent indigenous community.
The common law jury trial is an iconic political institution. It is
traditionally thought to exemplify a commitment to democratic selfgovernment. It is a sovereign power of the people capable of negating ·
the power of the state to use its powers of criminal prosecution against
its citizens. It has been deemed to be the "birthright" of every Englishman.219 Jefferson referred to it as "the only anchor ever yet imagined by
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution." 220 Tocqueville observed that it was "as direct and extreme a consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the people as
universal suffrage." 221 It is within the context of this trial dogma of
representative self-government that the practice of self-representation
has assumed a democratic aura, if not dogma, of its own. But in
countries outside the common law network, the institution of trial is
typically not intended to serve this democratic function, and it certainly
cannot assume such a function in the free-standing, non-sovereign
setting of the ICC, where there is no demos, either in the form of the
defendant himself or in that of the jury, represented at the trial.
The idealized democratic iconography of the pro se defendant invokes a plain-speaking individual appealing his case of unwarranted
prosecution directly to an engaged jury of fellow citizens bearing no
formal allegiance to the state. The heroic imagery never contemplates
such a prose defendant trying his case directly to a panel of state officials
in robes. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the right of
self-representation has no application beyond the trial courtlevel. 222 In
the international system, as in the civil law system, there is never a panel
of lay jurors. At the ICC, the defendant will be tried before a mixed

219. TRIAL BYJURY: THE BIRTil-RIGIIT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGlAND (London, 1865).
220. THOMAS JEFFERSON, 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 27 MARCH 1789-30 NOVEMBER
1789, 269 (Julian Boyd ed., 1958).
221. ALExls DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 261 (Haivey C. Mansfield & Delba

Winthrop, eds. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835).
222. Martinez v. California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
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panel of three international jurists. 223 This fact alone should be dispositive with regard to the structural incompatibility of the self-representation transplant in the international criminal justice system. The image
of a defendant, perhaps himself a former sovereign representative,
presenting his own case to a panel of professional international jurists
from various countries other than his own, with no shared social or
political culture to rely upon, bears none of the indicia of a selfdetermining sovereign people essential to the mystique of selfrepresentation. Furthermore, as Michael Scharf and Christopher Rassi
have noted, 224 the narrow spectrum of defendants subject to a war
crimes prosecution are precisely those politically engaged individuals
who are most likely to view a criminal trial, like diplomacy, as merely a
continuation of hostilities by other means.
The classical liberal individualism that supported the development
of the common law adversarial system presumes a central antagonism, a
clash of adverse interests, between the individual and the state, which is
deemed to have an inherent governing interest in restraining the
native liberties of its subjects. The state is therefore held to be inherently suspect or at least self-interested when seeking to deprive any
individual of his liberty. This mistrust of the power of public prosecution has supported the libertarian notion that the accused may reasonably believe that he has only himself to trust fully when engaged in a
struggle for his liberty in one of the state's own forums. The image of a
self-representing citizen standing alone against the prosecutorial power
of the state provides the native appeal of self-representation. This
deference to a much-exalted notion of embattled autonomy directed
against the state has permitted the Supreme Court in Faretta to acknowledge both the absolute right to self-represent. while simultaneously
recognizing that it was "undeniable" that such a choice would in most
cases prove harmful to the defendant and that "[t]he defendant, and
not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a
conviction." 225 It is inconceivable that the ICC, a strictly judicial nonsovereign institution that will try almost exclusively high-profile cases,
will be able to adopt such a deferential and cavalier approach to the
responsibility of the court to remain accountable for the integrity of its
own proceedings and the credible outcomes of the trials it conducts.
The common law adversarial system is also commonly conceded to

223. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 39(2) (b) (ii), July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 999.
224. Scharf & Rassi, supra note 212.
225. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
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have a lesser commitment to establishing the objective "tnith" of the
facts at issue in a criminal trial when compared to its civil law counterparts.226 The civil law system is said to be strictly committed to determining a more objective historical tnith, while the common law system is
thought to require only a systemic, or contingent, truth that permits
the lay jury to resolve the conflict between the opposing parties. The
adversarial philosophy supporting that system . reflects a classically
liberal laissez-faire approach to the production of truth. The silent
premise is that truth itself is a marketable concept that is best arrived at
through a minimally regulated market mechanism, the trial, which
provides a fair competition between self-interested parties. The competing parties, the state and the accused, are therefore permitted to
pursue only a truth that supports their interest in the outcome of the
case. The court itself is deemed not to have any overriding interest in
the proceeding, which includes not having any interest in securing an .
independent or objective truth not developed by the parties themselves. It is this premise of party-responsibility for developing the truth
that has permitted American courts to ignore the fact that selfrepresented individuals commonly refuse to introduce evidence that
would, as a matter of law, tend to demonstrate a mitigating or even
exculpating condition-even in circumstances where the accused is
facing a capital conviction. 227 This common law/ civil law divide is even
more pronounced with regard to international tribunals which have
typically, if not completely, assumed the mantel of the Nuremberg
tribunal to compile a true and accurate historical record for the world
community. 228 Already, international tribunals have begun to move
away from the more party-directed adversarial trial and towards a more
judge-directed trial where there is less sacrifice to the integrity of the
historical record. 229
Self-representation as an expression of political autonomy also has
virtually no grounding in the modem template of international criminal justice. As described earlier, the principle of autonomy as the

226. See generally Mirjan Damaska, Evidentary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506 (1973).
~27. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (circuit court refused to
permit the trial court to appoint counsel to present mitigating evidence at a capital proceeding).
228. See Patricia M. Wald, Foreword: War Tales and War Trials, 106 MICH. L. REv. 901, 911
(2008) (noting that recent experience, including her own as a judge at both American and ICIY
proceedings, has called into question "whether judges and adversary proceedings are indeed the
best way to ferret out historical truth (if such a thing can be determined).").
229. Kai Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: "adversarial", "inquisitorial" or mixecP., 3 INT'L
CRIM. L. REv 1, 18 (2003).
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primary philosophical support for a freedom of choice regarding
individual self-identity is not self-sustaining. The choice at issue must
itself be independently validated as a normatively sanctioned option.
Self-representation has not obtained such recognition within the various institutions of international law. Outside the common law system,
self-representation is not recognized to have intrinsic value. An individual charged today with war crimes, crimes against humanity or
genocide in a non-common law national forum would have no such
right. 230 "Given the contrary widespread practice of the civil law
countries, it would be difficult to properly conclude that the right of
self-representation has in fact attained the level of customary international law .... "231 International law, beginning at Nuremberg and as
now reflected in the several recent international criminal tribunals and
the ICC, has certainly assigned a clear value to the common law
adversarial trial system. 232 But the various conventions and working
groups that have constructed these more recent international courts
and tribunals have never examined and assigned a value to selfrepresentation as such. This silence suggests that self-representation
has simply been assumed to be a necessary adjunct to the adoption of
the adversarial system. But this is not the case. For example, the right to
a lay jury is one of the more revered adversarial entitlements in the
common law system, yet international law, beginning with Nuremberg,
has rejected it as a necessary element of international criminal justice.
Self-representation, particularly absent a lay jury, is entitled to no
greater accommodation as an essential choice of right within the
evolving structures of international adversarial justice.

230. Despite the fact that self-representation is not recognized in the continental European
countries and most such countries have national laws which permit compulsory representation by
counsel, neither the Human Rights Committee (HRC), which monitors compliance with the right
of self-representation in ICCPR art. 14(3)( d), nor the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),
which has jurisdiction over violations of the identical language in the European Convention on
Human Rights art. 6(3) (c), has ever developed a line of cases which essentially repudiate the laws
and practices in those countries. The single case before the HRC which did uphold a right of
self-representation, Hill v. Spain; was decided on the limited basis of an exceptional set of facts.
For a discussion of the limited opinion in Hill, see Scharf & Rassi, supra note 212, at 16.
231. Scharf, supra note 1, at 36.
232. "It is generally recognized that the adversarial system is more suitable when it comes to
offering protection to the rights of the accused." SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INT'L
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 16 (2003).
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C.

The International Cases

Until the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (IC1Y),
there had never been an' instance of self-representation before an
international criminal tribunal. The primary examples of self-representation have taken place at the IC1Y, but there have also been a few
near-occurrences at several of the other contemporary tribunals. Each
of the tribunals has found itself required to recognize at the outset that
there is a right of self-representation but only the IC1Y has found itself
bound to implement the right. The other tribunals have contrived ways
to avoid the right. But no matter where or how the right has been raised
in the courtroom, it has raised trouble for the tribunal-in some cases,
quite serious trouble.
The signature proceeding of the contemporary international campaign against impunity occurred with the IC1Y prosecution of Slobodan Miloseyic, the first head of state to be prosecuted for war crimes by
any international criminal tribunal. Unfortunately, the prosecution
became a signature failure in several critical respects. Foremost was the
fact that the prosecution failed even to be completed; after years of
protracted and interrupted proceedings, the trial was terminated when
the accused died of a. heart attack. More significantly for purposes of
this discussion, the trial failed because its major confrontation with
impunity was both obstructed and compromised; the integrity and
·professional competence of the tribunal itself was impugned; and the
trial proceeding actually served to resurrect, rather than to condemn,
the status of the accused in his native Serbia with regard to allegations
of his having directed a national campaign of genocide and related
atrocities. The critical factor that contributed to each of these failures
was that the defendant was permitted to self-represent.
Slobodan Milosevic was President of Serbia and then the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia during the Balkan Wars that raged during the
period 1991-1999. Beginning in May 1999, he was charged in three
separate indictments for multiple war crimes committed in Kosovo,
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was arrested in April 2001, and
transferred to the IC1Y in June of that year. At his initial appearance
before the IC1Y Trial Chamber in July 2001, he refused to recognize
the legitimacy of the court, refused to enter a plea to the indictment
and refused the assignment of counsel. He repeatedly attempted to .
deliver a diatribe against the court itself as an "illegal" and "false"
tribunal, as a result of which the presiding judge, Richard May, ultimately had the defendant's microphone cut off with the hopeful words:
2009]
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"Mr. Milosevic, this is not the time for speeches." 233 The court did,·
however, accept without challenge Milosevic's right to self-represent. 234
Milosevic was at that point asserting a right as a defendant that he
would not have enjoyed in his own country; the statutes of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia would have required him to be represented by
counsel on such charges. 235 Thus began the trial odyssey that endured
for over four years without coming near to completion.
The Trial Chamber was exceptionally accommodating to Milosevic.
In August 2001, six months prior to the start of the trial itself, the court
sua sponte ordered the assignment of three amici curiae who were to
serve strictly as friends of the court, and not as counsel to Milosevic, in
order to assist the court in providing a fair trial to the accused. At the
same time, the court denied a request by the prosecutor to appoint
defense counsel to the defendant. In November of that year and
thereafter the court also recognized various counsel, designated by the
defendant, as "legal associates" who obtained various counselor privileges but were officially neither friends of the court nor counsel to the
defendant. Milosevic, certainly no ordinary fool, managed from the
outset to take extended advantage of the court's largesse. "Bending
over backward to maintain the appearance of fairness, the Trial Chamber ... permitted Milosevic to treat the witnesses, prosecutors, and
themselves in a manner that would earn ordinary defense counsel
expulsion from the courtroom." 236 The court nonetheless continued to
accommodate Milosevic even as his health deteriorated as a result of a
severe high blood pressure condition. The court gradually reduced the
number of trial days per week, the number of hours per trial day and
also granted a series of extended adjournments of the trial. Eventually
the Trial Chamber resorted to directing the prosecution to pare down
its list of witnesses "to the point where prosecutors claim[ed] their case
[was] being emasculated. "237

233. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54, Initial Appearance 5 Uuly 3, 2001), availab/£ at
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/.
234. "You do have the right, of course, to defend yourself." Id. at 1.
235. Article 71 ( 1) of The Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia, based upon
the earlier code of the Republic of Yugoslavia, requires defense counsel in all cases where the
defendant faces a possible sentence of ten years or more, availah/£ at http:/ /www.legislationline.org/
documents/ section/ criminal-codes/ countryI 5.
236. Scharf & Rassi, supra note 212, at 4-5.
2:37. Mirko Klarin, War Crimes Manipulation: Slobodan Milosevic's Refusal to Accept Help in his
War Crimes Trial is Making it Difficult to Provide him a Fair Hearing, LoNDON FREE PREss, August 24,
2002 at F4, cited in Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Tria~ 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 915, N7
(2005).
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Throughout the trial, the prosecutor maintained that the court
should appoint formal defense counsel to Milosevic. Approximately
nine months into the trial, the prosecutor initiated another such
request with a new tactic. He relied upon an English case, McKenzie v.
McKenzie, 238 which would have permitted the Trial Chamber to appoint
a particularized version of standby counsel commonly referred to as a
"McKenzie friend." During the court colloquy on his request, the
prosecutor passed forward a· copy of the McKenzie case. Milosevic's
immediate response drew the line clearly:
As-despite my referring to all these international pacts and
covenants, European, American, Roman etcetera, the opposing
party is now once again referring to court practice and is
offering up McKenzie versus McKenzie. I am also going to
provide you with something. It is a copy from a court case, and it
is Faretta versus California, the United States Court, where
quite clearly once again it excludes the possibility of having
anybody impose a Defence counsel or lawyer to anybody unless
the accused wishes to appoint one himself. So I think it is
useless to carry on a discussion of this kind. 239
Milosevic was not alone in his belief that Faretta was the touchstone
reference for the right of self-representation in international as well as
American law. Following a series of oral decisions and comments
recognizing Milosevic's right to proceed pro se, the Trial Chamber
issued a full-length written opinion expressing its "Reasons" for deny-:
ing the prosecution's motions for the appointment of counsel. 240 The
court began its discussion by establishing that the ICTY was an essentially adversarial forum. 241 What followed was a clear reliance on Faretta
as the seminal statement of the role of the right of self-representation
in such an adversarial setting:

238. 1970 3 All. E. R. 1034.
239. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT--02-54, Transcript at 12840 (Nov. 11, 2002). available at
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/transe54/021ll1ED.htm.
240. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT--02-54, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion
Concerning Assignment of Counsel (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
milosevic/ trialc/ decision-e/040403.htm.
241. "[T]he proceedings of the International Tribunal are essentially adversarial and it is
against that background that this Discussion must follow." Id. at 1 20.

2009]

975

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Adversarial proceedings are a feature of the common law and
find little echo in systems based on civil law. As the Amici Curiae
have correctly observed, the imposition of a defence counsel
upon an accused who does not want one is a feature of
inquisitorial systems, but not of the adversarial systems ... The
reasons for this common law rule are clearly set out by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Faretta v. California ... 242
The Trial Chamber would later refer back to this reliance on Faretta
for having set out "the classical statement of the right to selfrepresentation."243 The Trial Chamber insisted that the Tribunal had
to be understood as one that had adopted the common law/adversarial
system as opposed to the civil law/inquisitorial system, and furthermore
that the right of self-representation was itself inherent in or essential to
that adversarial structure. Judge Richard May, the author of the opinion, apparently did not share the insight of his fellow British jurist,
Geoffrey Robertson, an Appeal Judge for the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, who later stated, "Courts which are 'international' must accommodate judges and lawyers from disparate legal traditions and adapt
the adversary model developed for Anglo-American jury trial to a
system in which guilt is established through judicial reasoning, and to
procedures influenced by the inquisitorial models adopted by European countries." 244
Milosevic continued to represent himself throughout the prosecution's case. When the prosecution concluded its case in February, 2004,
things began to come apart. Ill health forced presiding Judge May to
resign from the trial panel. He was replaced by Judge Iain Bonomy and
Patrick Robinson became the PresidingJudge. On July 5, 2004, the new
trial panel initiated a "radical review" 245 of the conduct of the proceedings in light of the fact that the trial was obviously flagging and the
defendant continued to insist on lengthy adjournments to address his
own ill health. Finally, on August 31, 2004, the defense began its case
with a two-day opening statement by Milosevic. Several days later, the
court issued an oral ruling on the most recent motion by the prosecution to appoint defense counsel. Over the defendant's strenuous

242. Id. at 11 21-22.
243. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence
Counsel 145 (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http:/ /www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/
040922.htm.
244. Robertson, supra note 207, at 2-3.
245. Prosecutorv. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54, Hearing 32153-4 (July 5, 2004).
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objection, the court directed that counsel be assigned. The court
attempted to rationalize its decision not as a restriction on the defendant's right to self-represent but rather as a measure designed to
protect his superior right to a fair trial. As part of its decision, the Trial
Chamber issued an Order on the Modalities to be Followed by Court
Assigned Counsel, in which it outlined a primary role for the assigned
counsel in the presentation of the defense case. The following day, two
of the amici were appointed as defense counsel. They immediately
appealed their assignment.
The Appeals Chamber accepted, in the light of Milosevic's continued
episodes of ill health, the appointment of counsel. But the appeals panel
sharply reversed the Order on Modalities as presenting an excessive and
disproportional restriction on the defendant's right to self-representation.
Once again, the court turned to Faretta to provide the rationale for a right
deemed to be universally recognized as an inherent and essential component of a fair trial in an adversarial setting:
This is a straightforward proposition: given the text's binary
opposition between representation "through legal assistance"
and representation "in person," the Appeals Chamber sees no
reasonable way to interpret Article 21 except as a guarantee of
the right to self-representation. Nor should this right be taken
lightly. The drafters of the Statute clearly viewed the right to
self-representation as an indispensable cornerstone of justice,
placing it on a structural par with the defendants' right to
remain silent, to confront the witnesses against them, to a
speedy trial, and even to demand a court-appointed attorney if
they cannot afford one themselves. In the words of the United
States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, which was recognized by the Trial Chamber as ~e classic statement of the right
to self-representation, an "unwanted counsel 'represents' the
defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal
fiction," such that "counsel [becomes] not an assistant, but a
master." Defendants before this tribunal, then, have the presumptive right to represent themselves notwithstanding a Trial
Chamber's judgment that they would be better off if represented by counsel. 246

246. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-02-54, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial
Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel 1 11 (Nov. 1, 2004), available at
http:/ /www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/ decision-e/041101.htm.
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The trial continued to stumble along until Milosevic died in his cell
on March 11, 2006. The trial was terminated three days later, thus
ending, without conclusion, international law's first and only major
experience with a self-represented defendant at a war crimes trial. The
public reaction has been unforgiving. The BBC News immediately
intoned, regarding the termination: "It raises questions which may
tarnish the reputation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (IC1Y) and undermine confidence in war crimes justice
generally." 247 The trial appeared to have turned the concern with
"victor's justice" on its head:
Throughout the proceedings, Milosevic berated witnesses and
launched scathing attacks against the legitimacy of the tribunal.
His tactics have had some resonance back home as Milosevic's
approval ratings have doubled, and he has gone from the most
reviled individual in Serbia to number four on the list of most
admired Serbs. 248
"He played to his supporters back in Serbia, put his accusers on the
defensive, and in general, turned the trial into an international spectacle."249 This was hardly an outcome consistent with the ambitions of
the contemporary international campaign to end impunity and restore
a public state ofjustice.
The Milosevic trial may prove to·_be the dispositive experiment with
self-representation in the international arena. Both the Trial and
Appeals Chambers presented an exalted view of the need to safeguard
a defendant's right to self-represent and were enormously generous in
the degree to which they accommodated that right. Yet, in the end, it
appeared rather pointless. The trial proceedings were characterized as
farcical by observers on all sides and there were no positive revelations
with. regard to the putative existential or liberty interests said to inhere
in the practice of self-representation. Rather, Milosevic transformed
the right to self-represent into a spectacle which he enjoyed and abused
at least as much as his American counterparts in the trials described
above.

24 7. Jon Silverman, Worst outcome fm- Milosevic tribunal, BBC NEWS, Mar. 11, 2006, http:/ I
news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/world/ europe/ 4 797696.stm.
248. Milan Markovic, In the Interests ofJustice?: A Critique of the JCTY Trial Court's Decision to
Assign Counsel to Slobodan Milosevic, 18 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 947, 947 (2005).
249. Jerrold M. Post & Lara K. Panis, Tyranny on Trial: Personality and Courtroom Conduct of
Defendants Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, 38 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 823, 825-26 (2005).
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It did not take long for the legacy of the Milosevic trial to be fully
realized. As the Milosevic case was fitfully wending it<> way through the
tribunal, the case of another Serbian political leader, Vojislav Seselj,
was slowly taxiing into position for a trial that has managed to outdo the
spectacle and failure of the Milosevic trial in almost every respect. 250
"Seselj's court manner has been much more threatening and insidious
than Milosevic's, the freedom he eajoys in court considerably greater
(gone is the remotely controlled microphone that the late Judge May
used to silence Milosevic), and the semblance of a criminal proceeding
even harder to locate in this case." 251 Seselj was a radical Serb nationalist who assumed major credit for developing the ideology of ethnic
cleansing. He was a major political activist who was noted for his
incendiary nationalist rhetoric on behalf of his crusade for a Greater
Serbia. In the early stages of the Balkan conflict he was positioned as an
ally of Milosevic but he rather quickly evolved into an outspoken rival.
Milosevic himself once referred to Seselj as the "personification of
violence and primitiveness." 252 He appeared to relish the opportunity
to extend his rivalry with Milosevic by utterly, and outrageously, outperforming him on the stage of his own trial.
Seselj appears to have well understood the opportunity for spectacle
presented by a war crimes tribunal. As early as 1994, shortly after the
formation of the IC'IY, Seselj stated in an interview: "Personally, I do
not recognize this Hague tribunal. I think it has no legal foundation,
but if I am ever invited to The Hague I'll gladly go there immediately. I
would never miss such a show." 253 His trial produced a publicly
broadcast campaign for political martyrdom. In the four-hour opening
statement he eventually presented at his trial, during which he repeatedly denigrated the judges and prosecutors, he closed by thanking
them "for allowing me to suffer for my ideology." He also expressed his
greatest regret that the Tribunal did not have a death penalty "so that
.proudly, with dignity, my head upright like my friend Saddam Hussein,
I could die and put the final seal on my ideology. It would become

250. The Seselj trial began in November 2007 and remains in progress as of this writing.
Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67, availab/,e at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/cis/en/cis_
seselj_en.pdf.
251. Alexander Zahar, Legal Aid, SelfRepresentation, and the Crisis at the Hague Tribuna~ 19 CR.
L. FOR. 241, 242 (2008).
252. Marlise Simons, Sero Nationalist's Trial Begins in the Hague, N.Y. TIMES, November 8, 2007.
253. Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defense n.5 (May 9, 2003), availab/,e at
http:/ /www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/030509.htm.
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immortal. "254
Seselj has been far more successful than his predecessor at exploiting
the protocols of accommodation adopted by the IC1Y during the
Milosevic trial. At his.initial appearance before the Tribunal in February
of 2003, he. declared his absolute resolve to represent himself and
demanded essentially all of the accommodations already extended to
Milosevic on the ground that "such practice cannot be changed from
case to case." 255 Shortly thereafter the prosecution filed a motion
seeking to have counsel appointed to Seselj on the ground that he
avowedly intended to "destroy" the Tribunal and that he intended "to
use the Tribunal as a political stage and source of media attention." 256
The Trial Chamber acknowledged that Seselj was already "demonstrating a tendency to act in an obstructionist fashion . . . and making
various frivolous demands framed in language inappropriate for a legal
document." 257 But the court nonetheless upheld his right to selfrepresent and merely appointed, over the defendant's objection, a
single standby counsel. The case thereafter struggled along with the
defendant exploiting virtually every opportunity presented to him to
offend the court. The vulgarity alone of his extensive written submissions to the court became extraordinary. 258
Three-and-a-half years after his initial appearance and six months
after Slobodan Milosevic died and his trial was terminated, the trial of
Seselj was scheduled to begin in November 2006. But the debacle of the
Milosevic trial was yet a fresh wound at the Tribunal. The trial chamber
had endured enough and appeared determined to avoid a repeat
performance by Seselj. In August, 2006, the court issued a preemptive

254. Marlise Simons, Fiery Speech by Serbian Leader at Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007.
255. Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defense 11 8-9 (May 9, 2003), available at
http:/ /www.icty.org/ x/ cases/ seselj/ tdec/ en/030509.htm.
256. Id. 1 4 n.5.
257. Id. 1 23.
258. For example, Seselj wrote in reference to the Tribunal Registry: "You, all you members
of the Hague Tribunal Registry, can only accept to suck my cock." With regard to another named
individual associated with the Tribunal, he wrote: "'Shit remains shit even ifit is wrapped in gold.'
Therefore, if this slime were to remove the black garment in which he appears that makes him
look like a raven and put on a golden uniform, he would still be what he is, shit in a human form."
And with regard to another named individual, he wrote: "How to tell him to kneel down and start
sucking Dr. Vojislav Seselj's Orthodox dick, but only on cue 'bow and begin.'? How to simply tell
him, monkey, eat shit, that's all you can?" Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on
Assignment of Counsel, 1148-52 (Aug. 21, 2006), availableathttp://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/
tdec/en/ses-dec06082le.pdf.
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ruling revoking Seselj's right to continue to self-represent. 259 The court
provided an extensive review of the beh<;tvior of the defendant which
"compromise[d] the dignity of the Tribunal andjeopardize[d] the very
foundations upo~ which its proper functioning is based. "260 The
chamber provided a lengthy typology carefully delineating the defendant's misbehaviors under the following headings: Obstructionist behavior; Deliberate disrespect for the rules; Disruptive behavior; Intimidation and slanderous comments in relation to witnesses; Accused's
ability to defend himself; and, Warnings to the accused. 261
The decision to revoke Seselj 's right to continue to proceed prose set
in motion a contentious split between the Trial and Appeals Chambers
that compromised the integrity of both the Trial Chamber and the trial
proceeding itself. The Appeals Chamber overturned the trial court's
decision and reinstated the defendant's right to self-represent. It did so
on the narrow ground that the Trial Chamber had not provided the
defendant with sufficiently specific warning prior to its decision. The
Trial Chamber thereupon reinstated Seselj as counsel and reappointed
standby counsel. The defendant immediately objected to the reappointment of standby counsel and became even more strident in his campaign to disrupt the proceedings. The Trial Chamber once again
attempted to draw the line and issued a set of findings related to the
defendant's conduct since the reinstatement of his prose status:
The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused has continued to
deliberately disregard decisions by the Trial Chamber, in particular its Decision on Filing of Motions, submitting motions
that are often tens of thousands of words over the limit set by
the Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber finds that the Accused
has repeatedly disrupted court hearings by deliberately and
unreasonably interrupting the proceedings and by refusing to
appear in court to represent himself. The Accused has been put
on notice, and specifically warned by the Trial Chamber, that
should his. disruptive and obstructionist conduct continue, the
Trial Chamber will consider imposing counsel on the Accused.262
And it did just that. In early November, 2006, the defendant went on

259.
260.
261.
262.
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a hunger strike to protest the reappointment of standby counsel and
refused to appear in court. On November 27, the Trial Chamber once
again revoked the defendant's right to self-represent and ordered the
trial to begin with the appointment of counsel. 263 But once ·again the
Appeals Chamber sided with the defendant in his stand-off with the
trial court. The Appeals Chamber ruled that the Trial Chamber had
incorrectly appointed standby counsel and nullified the trial proceedings that had taken place up to that point. 264 It ordered the trial to
begin anew when the defendant "is fit enough to fully participate in the
proceedings as a self-represented accused." 265 The trial did not in fact
recommence until almost one year later on November 7, 2007:
The handling of Seselj 's case calls into question the very idea of
international criminal justice as an orderly, rational, functional,
legal system. One wonders how (if that were not the case) it
could come to pass that a vexatious litigant who is the leader of
a party of ultra-nationalists whose declared aim is to destroy the
Tribunal, who regularly hurls insults at judges, prosecutors, and
other Tribunal staff, who issues threats to potential witnesses
and members of the public, and who is mentally unstable, has
managed twice to win back the privilege of self-representation
and is allowed to conduct his defense at trial at his pleasure with
almost total impunity. 266

Milosevic has therefore become the Faretta of international law. It is
the seminal case that was generously but foolishly decided and it has
immediately spawned a humiliating spectacle of its own design. 267
Fortunately, the other extant war crimes tribunals have not allowed

263. See Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-T, Decision on Request for Certification to Appeal
Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, 1 (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http:/ /www.icty.org/
x/cases/seselj/tdec/en/06.1205e.pdf.
264. See Prosecutor v. Seselj, No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial
Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel , , 29-30 (Dec. 8, 2006) available at
http:/ /www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/acdec/en/061208e.pdf.
265. Id.
266. Zahar, supra note 251, at 261.
267. The arrest, in July, 2008 ofRadovan Karadzic, the fugitive former Bosnian Serb leader,
who immediately claimed his right to· self-represent, will almost certainly require the ICIY to
review its commitment to its Milosevic/Seselj protocols. His trial has not begun as of this writing but
Karadzic has already informed the court of his heroic purpose in exercising his right to
self-represent: "I'm not defending myself in actual fact. What I am defending are the people over
there who have suffered .... It will of course be a precedent for small nations, small countries, not
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themselves to be quite so taken in by the false prophet of Faretta.
Although the right of self-representation appears in virtually the same
form in the founding documents of all the other international criminal
tribunals, all of the other courts have managed to avoid the creation of
their own "Milosevic." The other tribunals have typically acknowledged
the existence of the right of self-representation, when raised, but have
then avoided its application by either relying upon a procedural default
by the defendant268 or, more radically; by insisting that the unwaivable
right to a fair trial trumps the subordinate right to proceed pro se. 269
CONCLUSION

The practice of self-representation was for centuries the default
position for the common law trial. Its initial purpose and enduring
legacy were to prevent or forestall the presentation of a fair and

large ones." Prosecutor v. Karadzic, No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Status Conference 43 (Sept. 17, 2008),
available at http:/ /www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/trans/en/080917SC.htrn.
268. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-A, Trial Judgment~ 65 (June 1,
2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ cgi-bin/ texis/vtx/ refworld/ rwmain?docid = 4084f42f4&
page=search (" [T] he Appeals Chamber finds that it was difficult for the Trial Chamber to discern
any firm and unyielding desire on the part of the accused to represent himself. Even though
Akayesu did, on several occasions, express the desire to defend himself, his attitude towards the
Chamber suggested otheIWise"). For other ICTR cases expressing reluctance to recognize
self-representation, see Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on
Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw (Nov. 2, 2009), available at http:/ /69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/
cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/021100.htrn; Prosecutor v. Arsene Shalom Ntahobali, No. ICTR-9721-T Decision on Ntahobali's Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel, (June 22, 2001), available at
http:/ /69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/ cases/Ntaholbali/ decisions/220601.htrn.
269. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Augustine Gbao, et al, Decision on Application to Withdraw
Counsel, No. SCSL-o4-15-T, 'I 15 (July 6, 2004) ("It is clear from examining all of the circumstances of this case that the interests of justice would not be served by allowing Mr. Gbao to be
unrepresented before this Court. The Trial Chamber accordingly takes the position that it must
safeguard the rights of the accused and the integrity of the proceedings before the Court by
insisting that Mr. Gbao should continue to be represented by the Counsel that have represented
him throughout these proceedings. We hold that in this regard that an accused person cannot
waive his right to a fair and expeditious trial whatever the circumstances."). See also the very
encouraging opinion of the same tribunal in another case where it denied self-representation with
the following comment: "In arriving at this conclusion, we are guided by the opinion of Hon.
Judge Reinhardt's in the case ofFarhad v. United States, where The Learned Judge said that the
permitting of self-representation regardless of the consequences, threatens to divert criminal
trials from their clearly defined purpose of providing a fair and reliable determination of guilt or
innocence." Prosecutor v. Sain Hinga Norman, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga
Norman for Self-Representation, 1 25 No. SCSL-2004-14-T (June 8, 2004). With regard to Judge
Reinhardt's opinion, see U.S. v, Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
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equitable defense within the context of an increasingly adversarial
system. Ironically, the practice was not installed by the Supreme Court
as a constitutional right until after that Court had rendered the
practice both obsolete and odious to the contemporary counsel-based
adversarial system. Yet however ill-begotten the practice has been
within the common law national systems, it is utterly ill-conceived as an
adopted right within the normative and structural matrix of the contemporary institutions of international criminal justice. In the international arena, the right is an example of a malignant reception from the
common law without purpose or value, which must be aborted if the
campaign to construct credible and durable institutions of international justice is to have a fair chance.
The new standard-bearer for this campaign is the ICC. The mission
and structural design of the ICC are unique, and neither directly
replicates that of any other court or tribunal, either national or
international. The ICC is the first and only international criminal
tribunal created without a designated, ad hoc mandate. It shares the
retrospective ambition of the international tribunals of creating a
judicial historical record by credible prosecutions of designated atrocities, and the more prospective ambition of national criminal courts of
deterring future crime. It is designed as a semi-autonomous, permanent organ of unprecedented prosecutorial power with no guaranteed
political or law enforcement support for its selected endeavors. The
ultimate success of the court will therefore stand or fall on the demonstrated integrity attached to its individual prosecutions. It is not a court
with a wide margin for compromised prosecutions. It is highly unlikely
that the judges and other legal personnel committed to the success of
the court itself will find it tolerable to suffer the pointless compromises
to their professional and institutional integrity common to prose cases.
The right of self-representation is embodied within the articles of the
ICC. Yet Article 121 of the Rome Statute provides that "[a]fter the
expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State
Party may propose amendments thereto." The Statute went into force
in July, 2002. A Review Conference is planned for 2009. 270 The States
Parties should therefore seize this timely opportunity to remove the
burden of self-representation from the trying campaign of international criminal justice.

270. Information regarding the proposed conference is available at http:/ /www.iccnow.org/
?mod= review.
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